L 20 The Descent of Man. Part 1 



conclusion on savages possessing those virtues which are ser- 

 viceable, or even necessary, for the existence of the family and of 

 the tribe,— qualities which they undoubtedly do possess, and often 

 in a high degree. 



Concluding Remarks. — It was assumed formerly by philosophers 

 of the derivative 41 school of morals that the foundation of morality 

 lay in a form of Selfishness; but more recently the "Greatest 

 " happiness principle " has been brought prominently forward. 

 It is, however, more correct to speak of the latter principle as 

 the standard, and not as the motive of conduct. Nevertheless, all 

 the authors whose works 1 have consulted, with a few excep- 

 tions, 42 write as if there must be a distinct motive for every 

 action, and that this must be associated with some pleasure or 

 displeasure. But man seems often to act impulsively, that is 

 from instinct or long habit, without any consciousness of pleasure, 

 in the same manner as does probably a bee or ant, when it 

 blindly follows its instincts. Under circumstances of extreme 

 peril, as during a fire, when a man endeavours to save a fellow- 

 creature without a moment's hesitation, he can hardly feel 

 pleasure ; and still less has he time to reflect on the dissatisfaction 

 which he might subsequently experience if he did not make the 

 attempt. Should he afterwards reflect over his own conduct, he 

 would feel that there lies within him an impulsive power widely 

 different from a search after pleasure or happiness; and this 

 seems to be the deeply planted social instinct. 



In the case of the lower animals it seems much more appro- 

 priate to speak of their social instincts, as having been developed 



41 This term is used in an able 

 article in the 'Westminster Review,' 

 Oct. 1869, p. 498. For the " Greatest 

 " happiness principle," see J. S. Mill, 

 ' Utilitarianism,' p. 17. 



i2 Mill recognises ('System of 

 Logic,' vol. ii., p. 422) in the clearest 



ness extra-regarding impulse, di- 

 rected towards something that is 

 not pleasure ; that in many cases 

 the impulse is so far incompatible 

 with the self-regarding that the 

 two do not easily co-exist in the 

 same moment of consciousness." 



manner, that actions may be per- A dim feeling that our impulses do 



formed through habit without the not by any means always arise from 



anticipation of pleasure. Mr. H. any contemporaneous or anticipated 



Sidgwick also, in his Essay on pleasure, has, I cannot but think, 



Pleasure and Desire (' The Con- been one chief cause of the accept- 



temporary Review,' April 1872, p. ance of the intuitive theory oi 



671), remarks: "To sum up, in morality, and of the rejection of the 



4< contravention of the doctrine that utilitarian or " Greatest happiness " 



" our conscious active impulses are theory. With respect to the latter 



" always directed towards the pro- theory, the standard and the motive 



" duction of agreeable sensations in of conduct have no doubt often been 



" ourselves, I would naintam that confused, but they are really in 



" we find everywhere ;n conscious- some degree blended. 



