'Jiiap. XXI. General Sun. mar y. 6i\ 



avoid looking both backwards and forwards, and comparing 

 past impressions. Hence after some temporary desire or passion 

 has mastered his social instincts, he reflects and compares the 

 now weakened impression of such past impulses with the ever- 

 present social instincts ; and he then feels that sense of dissatis- 

 faction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind them, he 

 therefore resolves to act differently for the future, — and this is 

 conscience. Any instinct, permanently stronger or more enduring 

 than another, gives rise to a feeling which we express by saying 

 that it ought to be obeyed. A pointer clog, if able to reflect on 

 his past conduct, would say to himself, I ought (as indeed we 

 say of him) to have pointed at that hare and not have yielded 

 to the passing temptation of hunting it. 



Social animals are impelled partly by a wish to aid the members 

 of their community in a general manner, but more commonly to 

 perform certain definite actions. Man is impelled by the same 

 general wish to aid his fellows ; but has few or no special instincts. 

 He differs also from the lower animals in the power of expressing 

 his desires by words, which thus become a guide to the aid required 

 and bestowed. The motive to give aid is likewise much modified in 

 man : it no longer consists solely of a blind instinctive impulse, 

 but is much influenced by the praise or blame of his fellows. 

 The appreciation and the bestowal of praise and blame both 

 rest on sympathy ; and this emotion, as we have seen, is one of 

 the most important elements of the social instincts. Sympathy, 

 though gained as an instinct, is also much strengthened by 

 exercise or habit. As all men desire their own happiness, 

 praise or blame is bestowed on actions and motives, according as 

 they lead to this end ; and as happiness is an essential part of 

 the general good, the greatest-happiness principle indirectly 

 serves as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong. As the 

 reasoning powers advance and experience is gained, the remoter 

 effects of certain lines of conduct on the character of the indi- 

 vidual, and on the general good, are perceived ; and then the self- 

 regarding virtues come within the scope of public opinion, and 

 receive praise, and their opposites blame. But with the less 

 civilised nations reason often errs, and many bad customs and 

 base superstitions come within the same scope, and are then 

 esteemed as high virtues, and their breach as heavy crimes. 



The moral faculties are generally and justly esteemed as of 

 higher value than the intellectual powers. But we should bear 

 in mind that the activity of the mind in vividly recalling past 

 impressions is one of the fundamental though secondary bases 

 of conscience. This affords the strongest argument for educating 

 and stimulating in all possible ways the intellectual faculties of 



