Anali/sis of Dr. Hancock^ s theory. ^ 



dently result from observation and instruction, indicating an intel- 

 ligent power of combining means, and adapting them to ends 

 of which the creature is conscious ; these actions come within the 

 province of Reason "? If the latter, then the distinction between 

 Reason defined as a mere discriminating power, and Reason defined 

 as including a superior principle, appears to be lost : — if the former, 

 there is then an end of Brute Reason. 



At page 100, it is observed that " there is no more ground for 

 making an essential distinction between those outward faculties in 

 man and the brute, which compare ideas in order to draw simple 

 inferences, than for making a distinction in kind between their 

 respective powers of remembering. So that if the Brute can re- 

 member by his creaturely or animal nature, so may he reason, as 

 far as his limited capacity will enable him to do so, by the same 

 animal nature." But if it can be shown that the inferences in- 

 cluded in the foregoing examples of brute reason are not simple ; 

 but moral, complex, and ingenious ; it will follow that they require 

 a suitable reasoning power to produce them, — a capacity far trans- 

 cending that which is impliedly assigned to their '^ animal nature,'* 

 at the close of the above paragraph. Such actions cannot therefore 

 proceed from the conscious reason of the agent, unless this be 

 allowed to be a principle superior to that which is defined by the 

 author's restricted application of the term Reason. 



[^To be continued.'] 



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