76 Mr. French on the nature of Instinct. 



tion, indicating an intelligent power of combining means and adap- 

 ting them to ends of which the creature is conscious ; these actions 

 come within the province of Reason*''^ 



I must here remark that these definitions appear but ill to har- 

 monize with the author's general views before stated. For, it 

 may be asked, does not " an intelligent power," in the case of 

 Brutes, ^' combining means and adapting them to ends of which 

 the creature is conscious," presuppose some of that intuitive light 

 which the author considers '^ instinctive? ^^ In this view it is 

 difficult to separate, in a practical sense, the two definitions. 

 Besides what is intuitive in Man is not instinctive in the sense that 

 intuition is instinct in the Brute ; for the former surveys and is 

 conscious of this light of intuition or intelligence within, whereas 

 the latter is not ; this intuition in the latter is therefore intellec- 

 tually blind, however exalted the actions be which it enables him 

 to effect. 



To proceed however with the Theory before us. Reason, ex- 

 cluding any conscious superior light, and limited to signify the 

 ^' Discursive Faculty " before mentioned, is considered by the 

 author as a principle common to Man and Brute, and is treated of 

 in the early part of the volume, as to its being an attribute of the 

 latter, in the Section (p. 77) " On the power of Reasoning^ or 

 drawing inferences in Animals.''^ The Chapter commences thus : 

 — *' If we come to consider the instances of attachment, cunning, 

 fidelity, sagacity, gratitude, &c. in many of the lower animals, as 

 well as the difference between old and young in point of experi- 

 ence and usefulness, we cannot refer them to Instinct as above 

 explained. For we find them so numerous and well authenticated, 

 and these individual actions so diversified and adapted to times 

 and circumstances, that if man is beholden to Reason for this 

 power of adaptation, we must also admit that the brutes are like- 

 wise possessed of a degree of rationality. For as far as we are 

 enabled io judge of the uniformity of Instinct, and of the power 

 of the natural senses, these instances of sagacity belong neither io 

 one nor the other. Consequently they must belong io Reason, 

 or that intermediate power which compares and combines, adap- 

 ting means to ends, and varying these means according to emer. 



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