ji Mr. French on the nature of Instinct. 



require, in order to their accomplishment, something more than is 

 included in his restricted definitions of this faculty — they require 

 something which essentially belongs to those Superior Principles 

 which are elsewhere included by the author in what he terms the 

 ** enlarged use*^ of the term Reason, — something which, as to its 

 nature, is above the contemplation of the Brute, and which, if it 

 be not within the consciousness, must operate above it, as in the 

 case of Direct Instinct it confessedly does. 



Treating of the " Enlarged use of the word Reason,''^ and speak- 

 ing of Dugald Stewart, Dr. H. observes — " He is therefore desirous 

 not to confound our rational powers in general, in which he includes 

 the elements of Reasoning itself in other words, the fundamental 

 laws of human belief, with that particular branch of them, known 

 among logicians by the name of the Discursive Faculty. And he 

 says, ' the remark of Dr. Campbell, that without the aid of some 

 other mental power than the discursive faculty, we could never 

 attain a notion of what is good^ is undoubtedly true, and may be 

 applied to all those systems which ascribe to Reason the origin of 

 our moral ideas, if the expressions Reason and Discursive Faculty 

 be used as synonymous,' " — " But though he (Dugald Stewart) 

 cloes not ^ call in question the accuracy of those who have as- 

 cribed to it the function of distinguishing right from wrong,* 

 he does not himself assign to Reason this function." 



'^ Some authors," observes Dr. Hancock, " are quoted by this 

 writer to shew the enlarged acceptation in which the word has 

 been used. ' Reason (says Hooker) is the director of man's will, 

 discovering in action what is good ; for the laws of well-doing are 

 the dictates of right reason.' " 



At page 253, when treating of the Elements of Moral Feeling^ 

 Dr. H. observes, " There appears to me to be great propriety 

 in the following remarks from Dr. Beattie. ' Truth is something 

 fixed and determinate, depending not upon man, but upon the 

 Author of Nature. The fundamental principles of truth must 

 therefore rest upon their own evidence, perceived intuitively by 

 the understanding.' 



' Why should not our judgments concerning Truth be ac* 

 knowledged to result from a bias impressed upon the raind by its 



