Influence of the Human Mind upon Brutes, 173 



majestic peering of his deportment! whence does he surrender 

 his vast powers, and adapt them so admirably for war ? Surely 

 not from any reasonable intelligence concerning them, and con- 

 sequent application of them on his part : all that can be here said 

 of him is, that he is formed to be susceptible of influences the true 

 nature of which he is himself ignorant, and from which his 

 actions clothe themselves, if I may so speak, with an apparent 

 rationality. 



Whence can it arise that animals in a state of domestication are 

 capable of obeying the words addressed to them, while yet they 

 have no essential knowledge of them, — whence but from a col- 

 lateral instinctive influence received from man, and suited to affect 

 a mental organization formed with a capacity to be so affected ? 

 —the reality of this source of instinct, wonderful as it appears, is 

 not on that account less entitled to credit and belief than that of 

 instinct in general, provided it can be shewn that there are suffi- 

 cient grounds for admitting it : the fitness of the brute mind to 

 receive peculiar impressions of a high order, while their degraded 

 station indicative of a low species of consciousness, marks them to 

 be no partakers in reality, although they are so in appearance, of 

 those qualities which constitute Humanity ; these are the circum- 

 stances that, taken in connection with the positive and manifest 

 influence exercised by man over animals, — and without which it 

 would be impossible for man to tame any wild animal whatever, 

 unless the latter could be reasoned with,— form the grounds for 

 admitting this particular source of a collateral instinct, or at least, 

 of a modification of the general instinct by which the brute king- 

 dom is directed. — This explains why the Dog, who has no essential 

 knowledge of the words '' come here," nevertheless obeys them 

 so readily ; — why he understands even the looks and gestures, the 

 smiles and frowns of his master, although he knows not what is a 

 smile or a frown j — why his perception is positive with respect to the 

 influence of these things upon him. As well, however, might we 

 dignify by the name of Reason, the perceptions of the Cricket, 

 who directs her motions by the call of her mate, as ascribe it in. t^iis 

 case to the Dog. The perceptions of the latter are more varied and 

 perfect in degree, but equally remote as to kind from human per- 



