established Scientific Names. 139 



ornithologists of high scientific repute, as to the question now 

 under consideration. That any difference of opinion could 

 ever have existed, is to me a matter of no small surprise ; a 

 surprise which is by no means diminished on considering 

 the importance of the subject. The only rational ground on 

 which a dislike of change can be founded is, the indiscretion 

 which would be likely to be manifested by those who should 

 take on themselves to alter established names : many of these 

 alterations would, probably, be not for the better, and many 

 for the worse. But it would not be very reasonable to eschew 

 change altogether, because changes for the worse might be 

 made. If this principle were carried throughout, we should have 

 no improvements at all, because there is no human improvement 

 but what brings some admixture of evil. These remarks have 

 been suggested by a paper on nomenclature (VIII. 36 — 40.), 

 in which Mr. Strickland gives the world the benefit of his 

 thoughts on the subject. Let us examine this paper, and 

 probe the assertions therein broached, to see " what stuff 

 they are made of." 



Mr. Strickland begins by pronouncing " the custom which 

 seems to be daily gaining ground, of altering established 

 generic and specific names of natural objects, without any 

 sufficient reason for so doing," to be " highly detrimental to 

 the progress of natural history." Now, I think this to be a 

 proposition from which no well-wisher of natural history can 

 dissent; and no one will agree to it more cordially than I do. 

 But then the question arises, What is " a sufficient reason " 

 for a change? According to Mr. Strickland, there is, apparently, 

 no reason of sufficient importance to warrant an alteration, 

 except when a bird is removed from one genus to another. It 

 appears to me, that no one, who has impartially considered the 

 question, can hold an opinion so inimical to the interests of 

 science : all such persons will see that some change is necessary, 

 though there may be difference of opinion as to the extent to 

 which it is advisable to carry the reform. I shall, in another 

 part, discuss the circumstances under which alteration is 

 allowable, and shall now proceed in the examination of Mr. 

 Strickland's arguments. 



After many preliminaries about the u specific character," 

 and the " description," which have nothing to do with the 

 question in hand, Mr. Strickland comes to the point. " The 

 object of the specific name," says he, " is precisely the same 

 as that of all names whatever ; which have been defined to 

 be, ■ arbitrary signs, adopted to represent real things or con- 

 ceptions.' " This is an excellent definition of ordinary names 

 and proper names, but utterly inapplicable in regard to scien- 



