on Rules for Nomenclature. 279 



and from the sense which had been hitherto attached to it in 

 Zoology." The latter part of this statement Mr. . Strickland 

 has taken considerable pains to combat, and appeals, in sup- 

 port of his position, to the authority of Linnaeus and Erxle- 

 ben. That both these naturalists employed the term Simla 

 in a sense different from its real signification, is very true, but 

 that neither one nor the other of them sanctions its applica- 

 tion in the sense contended for by Mr. Strickland, is no less 

 so; and I should not consider myself justified in wilfully and 

 knowingly committing a fault, because others have done so 

 before me. And here let me pause, once more, to remark the 

 arbitrary and intolerant spirit of "legislation," tolerant of its 

 own sins, impatient of another s virtues : it is granted on all 

 hands, that my application of the term Simla, is conformable 

 to the exact and legitimate meaning of the word ; yet here 

 we have a "code of rules," professing to secure " propriety of 

 application," and in the same breath upbraiding me for my 

 adherence to this very principle, professing to secure " the 

 right of the founder of a higher division to give it a name," 

 and at the same time contesting my exercise of this unques- 

 tionable privilege ! And why ? Because, in spite of the 

 "right" and the "propriety," which the code pretends to se- 

 cure by one rule, their exercise, in this particular instance, 

 clashes with another ; and thus it is modestly expected, nay 

 insisted on, that every consideration of propriety, priority and 

 convenience, should give way to these ill-digested and con- 

 tradictory "rules" ! The whole system is one monstrous so- 

 phism, an egregious "petitlo prlncipll" and I must therefore 

 crave leave to persist in my own nomenclature, in spite of its 

 anathemas, not because it is my own, but because it is the 

 best I have met with. 



In protesting against my unqualified censure of all rules, 

 " as arbitrary and dogmatical, and equally opposed to good 

 sense, sound criticism, and fixed principles," Mr. Strickland 

 admits that some of them may be open to criticism, but thinks 

 it unfair to infer from one or two examples, that the whole 

 are equally deserving of censure. To convince Mr. Strick- 

 land that I did not generalize too rapidly in this matter, or 

 draw my inference from insufficient premises, I must beg leave 

 to make a few remarks upon two or three others of the rules in 

 question, taking my examples at random from his own "code" 

 and that of Illiger, and assuring him that in deprecating the 

 carelessness of the system, I mean no disrespect for the authors 

 or compilers of the "rules," or, to use the words of the cele- 

 brated Dr. Reid, on a similar occasion, " that no disparage- 

 ment is meant to the understandings ofMhe authors or main- 



VOL. II. — No. 17. N. S. A A 



