38 On the arbitrary Alteration of 



Now, in order that the object of the specific name may be 

 duly performed, it is essential that it be universally adopted, 

 and, therefore, never, or very rarely, altered. But it is not, 

 I think, essential that the meaning of the name should pre- 

 cisely designate the species ; or, indeed, that it should have 

 any meanifig at all. [See VI. 232., VII. 636.] Proper 

 names, in general, have either no meaning, or one not in any 

 way referring to the persons they represent ; and yet they are 

 found fully to answer their object of defining individuals, in 

 consequence of their being universally recognised, and never 

 altered ; and the peculiar names of species ought, I think, to 

 be in the same way regarded as proper names, the end of 

 which is defeated by repeated alterations. And, although 

 viewed in the light of a memoria technica, the recognition of 

 species, by means of their names, is certainly facilitated, if the 

 meaning of those names has a reference to the objects which 

 they represent, yet this is so far from being essential, that it 

 is, in some cases, prejudicial, by blinding persons to the dis- 

 tinction between the specific name and the specific character, 

 and causing them to regard the objects of the latter as belong- 

 ing to the former. Surely, then, the evil of changing a name, 

 which has once become current among naturalists, is much 

 greater than any advantage supposed to result from substitut- 

 ing a term which is " more appropriate." 



Some persons even maintain that the name of every species 

 should have a meaning applying to it exclusively. The above 

 arguments show that such a system of nomenclature, being 

 founded on a mistaken view of the object of specific names, 

 is therefore unnecessary ; and it is easy to prove that it would, 

 in many cases, be impossible : the specific character is supposed 

 to represent, in the most condensed form, that combination of 

 properties which distinguishes the species in question from all 

 others. In a few cases, one word is sufficient for this pur- 

 pose ; but, in general, a whole sentence is necessary, before 

 the species can be accurately defined. Therefore, if the 

 necessity existed to express the exclusive characters of a spe- 

 cies every time it is mentioned, it is plain that we must give 

 up specific names altogether, and recur to the long sentences of 

 Willughby and Ray. Nor should we mend the matter by 

 attempting, in defiance of all rules of language and of eu- 

 phony, to melt these sentences into such sesquipedalian words 

 as those which Mr. Thomas Hawkins has adopted for the 

 Ichthyosauri. [VII. 478.] 



In addition to the arguments above stated, there are several 

 other strong objections to the arbitrary and unlicensed alter- 

 ation of established names. If the species with which the 



