102 ' Mr. Vigors's Reply to some Observations 



There is this particularity however in Natural History that 

 these terms of genera and species have been particularly adopted 

 for groups of an ascertained rank in the scale of generalization. 

 For the greater convenience and precision of communication, as 

 well as to preserve uniformity in scientifick nomenclature, it seems 

 to have been agreed upon by common consent that every subject 

 in natural History should be designated by two names, one more 

 general, the other more specifick ; the first to point out the group 

 in nature to which it appears to belong, the second to point out 

 the especial station it holds in that general group. By equally 

 common consent, and for reasons which must be obvious to all,* 

 the two groups which are pointed out by the selected names are 

 those which represent the two first combinations formed in the 

 act of generalization as the mind advances upwards from indivi- 

 duals. To these combinations the terms genera and species are 

 respectively applied per excellentiam. And thus these terms, 

 which in their original acceptation might have designated every 

 assemblage of every rank in the series of generalization, assume a 

 definite signification when applied to Natural History ; species 

 denoting the proximate group into which individuals are united 

 by some quality or qualities common to all, and genus the proxi- 

 mate group into which species so formed are similarily united. 



Were the subjects of Natural History like those of many other 

 branches of science, definite in their numbers, and well ascertained 



* The chief advantage resulting from the use of the proximate genus is the 

 brevity attending it. The tediousness of summing up all the various more 

 remote terms is avoided by using one which comprehends all. When we name 

 a subject in Natural History by the usual terms of science, I consider that we 

 in some measure may be said to give a definition of it. Now the correct mode 

 of defining any thing, is " by joining the general and special nature together, 

 or (which is all one) the genus and the difference." [Watfs Logic. Pari I. 

 c/^. I V. j». 94- 3 Dr. Watts sufficiently explains the reason, why the genus 

 thus used should be " the nearest genus." [lb. p. 95.] Mr. Locke also notices 

 the quickness and brevity resulting from the use of the proximate genus. 

 " This may show us the reason why in the defining of words, which is nothing 

 but declaring their significations, we make use of the genus or next general 

 word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save 

 the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general 

 word or genus stands for." [Book 3. ch. 3. § 10 ] 



