402 EUROPE AND HER DESPOTS. NO. II. 



lever he possessed in young Napoleon, than he skilfully repairs the loss 

 by drawing the Bourbon family into his clutches. 



The period for commencing a fierce crusade against the revolutionary 

 principles of the three days, a project that has never slumbered, is on 

 the eve of its development ; the military despots have protocolled till the 

 favourable moment for executing their machinations against freedom has 

 arrived. The political elements of France are rife for an explosion and 

 Louis Philippe is te aux abois" This will be found no vague conjecture 

 the offspring of a over heated imagination. A single glance at the 

 map will convince us of its truth, and show us the allied armies taking 

 up the identical basis of operations which they occupied in 1815 ; 

 a line extending from the ocean to the Alps. The Austro-Bavarian 

 army have their right on Mayence, their centre on Switzerland, and 

 their extreme left on the passes of Piedmont. The Prussians extend 

 from Mayence, or, rather, Sarre Louis to the frontiers of Holland ; while 

 the army of this latter power threatens the ephemeral kingdom of 

 Belgium, and the Russian columns are cantoned on the Oder. In a few 

 weeks these powers can bring 800,000 men in line. What has France 

 to oppose to these formidable masses ? We hear a great deal of the 

 effective force of her army, of the project of mobilizing the hundreds of 

 battalions of the national guard; the recollection of the memorable cam- 

 paign of ] 792 is still fresh on our memories, and may dazzle the imagin- 

 ation. But they will err, who seek to trace an imaginary future upon the 

 recollection of this period, so fertile, we admit, in prodigies. The circum- 

 stances of the times are widely different. Then, a feeble coalition directed 

 by paltry interests, and by a spirit of conquest sought to dismember the 

 French territory. When effects can be traced to their cause, the results, 

 however, cease to astonish us. The system of warfare pursued by the 

 allies was absurd an extended line of cordon, against some point of 

 which it was only necessary to precipitate a powerful mass to insure 

 success. It was to their superiority in strategy, and not to the supe- 

 riority in the tactics and the composition of their armies which at that 

 period as in the present day, were as inferior en masse to the allied 

 army, in every military requisite, as they are individually superior ; 

 thus Jomini, in his <( considerations sur les guerres de la revolution" 

 attributes the splendid successes of the French. But it must now 

 be recollected that the strategy of Napoleon and the leading features of 

 his system de guerre, are as well understood by the northern despots as 

 by the marshals of France themselves. Again, we may look in vain for 

 the patriotic elan that blazed so fiercely forth at the outbreak of the 

 revolution, and produced such magnificent, such triumphant results. 

 The present political horizon of France is overclouded with the shadows 

 of coming events. The Carlists, undaunted by defeat, are again muster- 

 ing in the south, the republicans are assuming an imposing attitude in 

 the capital ; while the moderate party, disgusted with the timid policy, 

 the paVK a tout prix system, that sacrificed heroic Poland, and abandoned 

 Italy, are deserting the king whose throne rocks beneath him. A few 

 months, we predict, will bring about great events, and Louis Philippe 

 will be awakened by the fire of the enemies bivouacs, to the galling con- 

 viction, that his abject crouching to the military powers has excited their 

 attack. Late, too late, he will discover that his true policy consisted in 

 seizing the initiative and marching with the movement. 



