[ 626 ] [DEC. 



NOTES FOR THE MONTH. 



THE battle between the Turco-Egyptian fleet, and the squadrons of the 

 allied powers, at Navarino, has been the only event of foreign political 

 interest in the last month : and, although we regret that such an affray 

 should have taken place, it does not at all alter our opinion as to the eventual 

 pacific termination ("pacific," as far as the peace of Europe at large is 

 concerned) of the Greek contest. The Turks probably, ever since the de- 

 claration in favour of Greece was made, have doubted whether England, 

 their old ally, would seriously go to war with them upon such a question. 

 Moreover, according to the constant principle of their policy, they would 

 exert themselves to get ridoi the quarrel, if they could not hope to beat us 

 upon it : to evade our object, if they could not defy it, by all possible means 

 of equivocation and delay. And it could scarcely be any great circum- 

 stance of wonder, if a fierce and obstinate people, compelled to trim, and to 

 dissemble, where they would be incomparably better inclined to fight, were 

 urged, when they found negotiation would serve their turn no longer, into 

 some act of sudden and partial hostility. We still confidently believe however 

 that these hostilities will be only transitory, and that there is not the slightest 

 chance that Europe will be involved in war. Even the blind fury of the 

 Turks, accustomed as they have been to misapprehend the cause of their own 

 existence in Christendom, will stop short before it leads them into a course 

 so certain to produce their entire destruction. This, however, is a considera- 

 tion rather for the future ; and, be the event what it may, nothing can be 

 more certain than that we had no choice, at Navarino, but to act as we have 

 done. Independent of all commendation for bravery or naval skill, the 

 sound judgment of Admiral Codrington's conduct is undoubted. Our inten- 

 tion as to Greece- be its policy good or bad had been declared : time 

 had been allowed for consideration : no definitive answer was made to our 

 demands ; and in the meantime our object was being evaded, and our power 

 getting into some danger of being despised. This .was a state of affairs 

 which could not continue : it became necessary either to act decisively, or 

 to abandon our declared policy, aud determination altogether ; and between 

 these two courses, it would have been impossible for the commander of the 

 British fleet to balance for one moment, without the most criminal and 

 infamous betrayal of his duty. 



For the immediate quarrel which led to hostilities, arose, it will be 

 remembered, on the part of the enemy; whose fire upon our flag of truce 

 was a course, no doubt, for themselves to judge of but certainly an in- 

 sult, which no commander of an English force could overlook. It may be 

 possible, as has been urged, that this fire was a " mistake " and an unau- 

 thorised proceeding ; but, at all events, it was a most irregular and dange- 

 rous mistake ; and we venture to predict that it was such a " mistake " as 

 will not occur again. We regret, as we have already stated, that the 

 result of this contest should have been so serious to the enemy : and see 

 no ground .for national triumph in a victory which our arms have gained 

 honourably, but which would have covered us with shame and disgrace 

 not to have achieved : but we repeat that we are not surprised that some 

 proof that Europe was in earnest should have been necessary to expe- 

 dite the arrangement of the Greek question. The chuck under the chin 

 which the Porte has received in the affair, has been severe : but no doubt 

 it will prove a lesson and it is one which certainly they have long stood 

 in need of to convince our friends, the Ottomans, that our habitual defe- 



