1832.] Russia in 1832. 319 



sable for the safety of the army, and, by shewing an imposing front, a 

 peace they obtained on what terms all the world knows. 



If we critically examine this celebrated campaign, which cost the 

 Russians 250,000 men, disorganized their army, exhausted their finances, 

 and spread discontent through every province of the empire, we shall 

 discover that never in the annals of war was temerity crowned with 

 greater success, never was an army so exposed to inevitable destruction 

 by the blind imprudence of its chief than the Russians throughout this 

 campaign. In advancing from their base of operations on the Danube 

 towards the Balkan, they left behind them the chain of fortified places 

 still in possession of the enemy, garrisoned by upwards of 80,000 men^ 

 from Widin to Mangalia. To have advanced with safety, those places 

 should have been blockaded an operation, which the numerical strength 

 of the invaders was inadequate to ; Diebitch thus left in his rear upwards 

 of 80,000 men, who, if the Turkish generals had possessed but the 

 simplest principles of the science of war, might have concentrated, have 

 cut him off from his base, driven him on the sea, and destroyed his 

 army. Throughout the entire march from the Danube to Adrianople, 

 the right flank of the army was constantly exposed and threatened by 

 the enemy. Had the Turks have turned this flank and they might 

 easily have effected it entangled in the defiles of the Balkan, their left 

 flank resting on the sea unable, from the nature of the ground, to make 

 use of their numerous cavalry cut off from their base, the destruction 

 of the Russian army was certain. We readily allow that, in a campaign 

 against the undisciplined valour of the Turks, a Russian general, com- 

 manding the most powerfully constituted troops in Europe, need not 

 altogether act as if he had a Napoleon in his front. Still Diebitch's 

 plan of the campaign was a gross violation of the fundamental principles 

 of war, and but for the blind fatuity of the Turkish commanders, the 

 Balkan, which afterwards became the proud title of his glory, would 

 have been the grave of him and his army. 



Again, it must be recollected, that the Turkish empire was unpre- 

 pared for the contest, that the " clan" of her ancient military institutions 

 was gone ere the reforming projects of the Sultan had fully developed 

 themselves. Yet, notwithstanding this, and the total want of military 

 skill displayed by the Turkish commanders, had the Turks possessed a 

 few well constructed forts in the defiles of the Balkan, and a strong for- 

 tified place towards Faki, the Russian army would never have reached 

 Adrianople. 



The extravagant notions entertained of the military power of Russia, 

 are thus not only fallacious, but the result of this campaign proves that 

 under a proper military system, Turkey is fully competent to resist the 

 aggressions of her northern neighbour. 



At this moment, when Europe awaits with deep anxiety the decision 

 of the northern sovereigns, about to meet at Torgau, it is a subject of 

 deep gratification to reflect, how studiously magnified have been 

 the military resources of Russia. The present state of Europe becomes 

 every day more complicated, and the chances of peace and war are con- 

 sidered by many, accustomed to watch the varying phases of the poli- 

 tical horison, as equally balanced. The nobles of Prussia, with the 

 prince royal at their head, are burning to rush into a crusade against 

 the principles of the French Revolution. The feelings of the Russian 

 and Austrian cabinets cannot be mistaken, while the king of Holland 



