1832.] Russia in 1832. 321 



subdued, and military possession obtained of the whole line of march 

 in order to secure the army's communications. At Bochara, a populous 

 city situated in the midst of a fertile country, supplies would be abun- 

 dant, and here the Russian army would form their second base, and 

 establish depots and magazines. From Bochara to Attock, on the 

 Indus, the distance does not exceed six hundred miles. The country 

 through the whole line of march is fertile, so that the Russian com- 

 missariat would without much difficulty be able to collect the necessary 

 supplies of provisions and forage for the troops. Facility of trans- 

 port is another feature remarkable in this country, and one of the 

 highest importance in military operations. At Attock, the breadth 

 of the Indus is inconsiderable, but the stream is both deep and 

 extremely rapid. Should the Russians be able to push across this river, 

 they would doubtless look for the co-operation of Run jet Sing and his 

 army. The rapid rise of this formidable power on our northern fron- 

 tier has already caused considerable uneasiness to our Indian Govern- 

 ment ; his troops are numerous, well composed, and disciplined by 

 Russian and French officers ; moreover, he has for some time past 

 carried on an active correspondence with the cabinet of St. Petersburg. 

 The junction of the invaders with this sheic prince might prove fatal 

 to our power in India. Their object would be, either to march upon 

 Delhi, and proclaim the deposed dynasty of the house of Timor, which 

 might excite a general rising against us ; or advance to the southward, 

 through the Punjab, upon our Bombay Presidency. Now it cost Alex- 

 ander a year to reach the Hydaspes. Nadir Shah's expedition occupied 

 nearly eleven months, although his force consisted chiefly in cavalry. 

 But the march of a Russian army from the Caspian to the Indus, en- 

 cumbered as it would be with artillery, and all the atterail of modern 

 armies, would require at least two campaigns. Long ere the Russian 

 columns could therefore reach the banks of the Indus, Runjet Sing 

 would be crushed, and an Anglo-Indian army in position on the eastern 

 bank ready to give the invaders a warm reception. We have seen that 

 in the war with Turkey, a limitrophe power, Russia was unable to bring 

 more than 200,000 men into the field. For the invasion of India, from 

 the difficulty of subsisting them, not more than 100,000 could be well 

 employed. At least a third of this force would be requisite to line the 

 country in their rear as they advanced ; and when we consider that the 

 march of the army would lie across deserts, in a burning climate, so fatal 

 to the northern constitutions of the troops, when we further reflect on 

 the casualties to which, even in Europe, an army is exposed in campaign, 

 where by the establishment of hospitals every care is taken of the sick 

 and wounded ; we are confident that on reaching the Indus, the Rus- 

 sian army would barely muster 30,000 combatants, a force totally 

 inadequate for the object of the campaign. On the other hand, when 

 on glancing at the map we survey the vast extent of our Indian Empire, 

 and reflect on the immense rayon on which our military operations 

 would be carried on when we reflect on the tenure by which we hold 

 these possessions, we are fully sensible of the delicacy of our position, 

 and of the numerous chances that might operate against us. From 

 Calcutta to Delhi, our first base of operations, the distance is eight. hun- 

 dred miles from the Madras Presidency, about eleven hundred from 

 Bombay, six hundred thence to the Indus, our front of operations, the 

 distance is again five hundred. Our line of operation would therefore 



