322 Russia in 1832. [MARCH, 



exceed the length of that of the Russians from their first base on the 

 Caspian to the Indus. Numerous as is our Indian army, it must not 

 be concealed that it would require a large force to hold this immense 

 line of country in subjection : a measure of imperative necessity, for 

 the moral effect on an army of 30,000 Russians, on the native popula- 

 tion, is at best problematical. The great danger to be apprehended is, 

 that the fidelity of the native troops might be tampered with ; such a 

 contingency does not pass the bounds of probability, especially as the 

 late reductions in the pensions and allowances of our Indian army has 

 spread disaffection through its ranks. Still, on carefully weighing the 

 chances for and against such an enterprise, we confidently assert that 

 India can'never be wrested from us by a Russian invasion. It is an 

 undertaking beyond her means, though we cannot conceal from ourselves, 

 that such an undertaking would prove ruinous to the company, and ulti- 

 mately fatal to their power. Besides, our government at home would 

 not be idle as a circle is weak in ratio to the area of its circumference, 

 so is Russia in like manner weakest at her extremities, and here it is 

 that England might strike a fatal blow at her power. We might stir 

 up the slumbering hatred of Persia and Turkey, excite the Caucasian 

 tribes, and assail her flanks in the Baltic and Black Seas. Not a Russian 

 flag would dare shew itself on the ocean, and every outlet of her com- 

 merce would be closed ruin, discontent, nay, open revolt, would shew 

 themselves in every province of the empire. The numerous nations 

 held together by the iron hand of Muscovite despotism, would seize the 

 favourable moment for re-asserting their ancient independence ; and 

 the dismemberment of this gigantic empire of the Czars, the favourite 

 theory of politicians, might be practically realized. 



In the course of this paper we flatter ourselves that we have proved 

 to the satisfaction of our readers 1st. That the financial means of Rus- 

 sia, are inadequate, to any great and protracted enterprise. 2d. That 

 from this cause, and the immense extent of her dominions, and the dif- 

 ficulty and expense of moving troops from one quarter to another, the 

 apprehensions entertained of her military power, at least offensively, 

 notwithstanding the number and composition of her armies, are baseless. 

 3d. That her successes in the Turkish campaigns arose from the total 

 want of military skill, and the absence of all military organization on 

 the part of her adversary while the heroic defence of the gallant but 

 ill-fated Poles, has proved what may be achieved by valour and disci- 

 pline. 4th. That the idea of the conquest of our East India possessions 

 by this power, is visionary ; though we are willing to allow, that the 

 expense of such a contest might ultimately entail ruin on the East 

 India Company. 5th. That Russia contains within herself the seeds of 

 her own destruction that sooner or later this mighty empire must 

 collapse under its own weight, and fall into pieces ; thus proving, that 

 the extravagant notions of her overwhelming military power, which 

 since the campaign of 1812 have been the terror of Europe, and have 

 exercised so decided an influence on the political system of our con- 

 tinent, are like the gigantic figures of a phantasmagoria the optical 

 delusions of which, a near inspection reduces to their proper dimen- 

 sions. 



