1832.] On the Military Resources of the Austrian Empire. 535 



we have mentioned, she might have decided the fate of Europe. By the 

 diplomatic arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, Austria acquired a 

 compact geographical "arrondisement" of kingdoms and provinces, with 

 a considerable line of sea coasts, containing upwards of thirty millions of 

 inhabitants an empire which, if its interests were well understood and its 

 resources fully developed, might prove a match for the most powerful on 

 the continent. Yet, from the blind fatuity of its government, this country 

 is daily impoverished 5 while, owing to a defective military system, her 

 armies have been almost constantly beaten in the field, and captured like 

 herds of cattle. To what causes are we to attribute the continued disasters 

 of this power, whose army as a body is as much superior to the French, 

 as the French soldier is individually superior to the Austrian ? We shall 

 answer this question in the words of the Archduke Charles " Austria 

 was worsted because the operations of her adversary were based upon a 

 well combined system of fortresses, a careful survey of the whole theatre 

 of war, and the direction to one ' but ' of the force employed, to which 

 she had only to oppose the bravery and superior organization of her 

 army, and some splendid, though insulated triumphs of her generals." 



It has been the fashion to attribute the disasters of the Austrian armies 

 to the Aulic Council, and it must be confessed, that a general, whose genius 

 and arm is fettered by the plans of a military board at a distance from the 

 theatre of operations, must contend to a disadvantage with an adversary 

 more favourably circumstanced ; but the evil, we suspect, lies much deeper ; 

 several essential conditions concur in the perfection of an army : a good 

 recruiting system a good formation a well organized system of national 

 reserves strict discipline, without being humiliating to the soldier a 

 well combined system of rewards and promotion a scientific corps of 

 artillery and engineers and lastly, a staff capable of availing itself of all 

 these elements, the organization of which corresponds with the instruc- 

 tion of its officers. In this last essential, the Austrian army is miserably 

 deficient ; it is a body without a soul. The Imperial generals were con- 

 stantly out-strategised : when a new system of warfare had been intro- 

 duced, they continued to manoeuvre, " a la Daun ;" and while the object 

 of the French was to attain their end, "coute qui coute," the old-fashioned 

 system of the Cordon betrayed the Austrian commanders into the dan- 

 gerous practice of dividing and subdividing their forces. With a view of 

 covering a line of frontiers, they found themselves unequal to maintain 

 the few points it was important to preserve ; and while they were. uselessly 

 garrisoning every village, were obliged, after a series of disasters, to aban- 

 don whole provinces to the enemy. It was by an obstinate adherence to 

 this cautious system, in opposition to the " en avant tactique" of Napoleon, 

 that we must look for the true cause of their defeats. In 1796, by acting 

 upon the single line, he defeated in detail the corps of Bosera and Alvinzi. 

 In 1805 he annihilated the army of Mack ere the Russians under Kouto- 

 zoff, advancing through Moravia, could effect their junction. And again 

 at Wagram, the Archduke Charles, by acting on two exterior lines against 

 the single line of his adversary, failed, owing to the non-cooperation of 

 the Archduke John. In fact, it is a deviation from the fundamental prin- 

 ciples of the science of war, to act with detached corps that have no com- 

 munication with each other, against an enemy whose forces are centralized 



