278 THE SUPREMACY OF PUBLIC OPINION. 



If, therefore, it cannot be denied, that the opinions of the people 

 limit and restrain the exercise of authority, even in countries where 

 they possess no direct share in the administration of public affairs, 

 how much more truly may this be affirmed in regard to those states, 

 where it is an admitted, and, to a certain extent, a practical truth, 

 that all power is derived from the people, must be employed for 

 their benefit, and in accordance with their general principles and 

 wishes. In the former, disaffection may continue to spread among 

 the people for a considerable time before it breaks forth into open 

 resistance : in the latter, every important act of government elicits 

 a strong expression of public feeling ; and each individual speedily 

 becoming acquainted with the sentiment of his fellow citizens, speaks 

 and acts without fear, and without restraint. In the former, rulers 

 may commit great and glaring errors ; but, unless they are such as 

 to arouse the dormant political energies of an ignorant and careless 

 multitude, they produce no permanent impression, and may be easily 

 repaired. But the case is altogether different in the latter, where all 

 the proceedings of government are watched with unceasing jealousy, 

 and where ministers, if once they enter upon impolitic and unpopu- 

 lar measures, can neither proceed without infinite danger, nor retreat 

 without great dishonour. In the former, the task of government is 

 comparatively an easy one ; and it requires no very profound sagacity, 

 nor extended knowledge, to understand the prominent features which 

 distinguish the character of a particular nation, and to refrain from 

 correcting its prejudices, in such a manner as to irritate the ignorant 

 and inert mass of its population : but, in the latter, ambition pays a 

 costly price for its gratification ; and deep and corroding must be the 

 anxieties of that statesman, whose object it is to frame his measures 

 in accordance with the existing state of public opinion, without 

 greatly falling short of, or exceeding its demands. In a word, in every 

 free state that is, in every state where there is freedom of speaking 

 and of acting public opinion must be the sovereign power ; and no 

 important measure, affecting the general interest of the country, can 

 proceed to any final issue, unless it has received its sanction. 



But there are some, who regard the principle which we have now 

 stated, as a very dangerous one ; and who are in the habit of assert- 

 ing, that statesmen ought to look at measures only as they are in 

 themselves, and not with reference to the manner in which they are 

 likely to be received by those whose benefit it is, or ought to be, 

 their intention to promote. Now, it appears to us, that the reasoning 

 adopted by that pretty numerous class to which we have alluded, 

 proceeds upon some material errors; which, if exposed, would prove 

 the absurdity of assertions, which are advanced with so much confi- 

 dence and self-complacency. When we assert the necessary supre- 

 macy of public opinion, it seems to be the belief of those who object 

 to this principle, that the meaning we intend to convey is, that par- 

 ticular statesmen must sacrifice their political principles, when they 

 discover that they are opposed to the decisions of this public opinion. 

 Nothing could be further from our intention, than to make any such 

 insinuation. The only point which we wished to establish was, that 

 it is a necessary condition, on the existence of a free state, that the 



