494 PALMERSTON POLICY. 



has been engendered by their diplomacy, in spite of the autocrat's 

 machinations ? Is it not the interest of these three powers, that the 

 culminating position of Constantinople should be really and effec- 

 tually guarded, and prevented from becoming the capital of a Musco- 

 vite appanage ? 



These are questions that are solved as soon as they are clearly 

 enounced. But in interfering in the affairs of Turkey, in arresting 

 the career of Ibrahim, these three powers have arrested the march of 

 that regeneration that alone could save the Ottoman empire, and 

 erect upon the shores of the Bosphorus a barrier against Russian inva- 

 sion. Whether they succeed or not in obliging the squadron of Nicholas 

 to quit the harbour of Constantinople, they must make up their 

 minds, if they persist in their policy towards the Viceroy of Egypt, to 

 see him sooner or later fix himself upon the throne of the Sultan. A 

 mere pretext will suffice, and when the favorable moment for acting 

 shall have arrived, he will laugh to scorn the diplomacy aye, and 

 the armaments too of combined Europe. Once master of the Ottoman 

 capital, who could drive him from it ? 



A prompt regeneration can alone save Turkey. But to the Sultan 

 Mahmoud such a regeneration is impossible ; and to maintain this 

 Prince any lowger upon the throne, would only be to hasten the dis- 

 solution of the empire. The future prospects of the Osmanlis are 

 centered in the person of Ibrahim Pacha, and the cause of Egypt ap- 

 pears to us to be that of the whole nation. 



In opposition to these views, it may be asserted that Mehemet Ali 

 is a vassal of the Sultan's, and to support him would be consecrating 

 a revolutionary principle. But is it in the 19th century that this 

 obsolete feudal question is to be revived ? Besides, it supposes pro- 

 tection on one side. But latterly it is Egypt that has protected the 

 Porte, and it would be eminently absurd that national force should 

 pay tribute to national weakness. It is utterly futile to talk about a 

 revolted vassal, of political engagements, and so forth : the force of 

 things is equally imperative upon governments as upon individuals, 

 and by obliging Mehemet Ali to recall his army and to evacuate 

 Syria and Anatolia, these three powers would not by that means 

 guarantee for six months longer the reign of Mahmoud. As to the 

 armed intervention of Russia France and England oughtnot to have 

 allowed it under any pretext ; and if a war with that power were 

 inevitable, they ought not to have waited to decide upon it till she 

 was mistress of Constantinople. 



The policy pursued by the ministers of England and of France 

 has been such, that had they been in the pay of Russia, they could not 

 more effectually have served that power. On the one hand they 

 propose to the Russian Admiral to return to Sevastopol, and guarantee 

 the integrity of the Porte, while on the other, they imperiously order 

 the Egyptian to evacuate Syria, and threaten him, in case of refusal, 

 to enforce the mandate, bidding him content himself, as the only in- 

 demnity for so many victories, with the simple investiture of the Pa- 

 chalic of Acre ! Mehemet Ali must naturally have been furious at 

 these conditions, since he had concluded, with the envoy of the Porte, 



