1830.] The Campaign of the Spanish Constitutionalists. 677 



thing in their conduct strongly indicative of adhesion to the cause of 

 freedom. But this ought to be subject of no wonder. They knew that 

 an overwhelming force was advancing in every direction against the re- 

 fugees, and the issue of so preposterous a contest as that of five or six hun- 

 dred devoted men against an army of six or eight thousand regular troops 

 was easily to be foreseen. From this general dread, the apathy of many 

 and the decided hostility of others,, the most fatal results ensued. As we 

 have before said the constitutionalists met with no support within, and 

 madness alone would suppose that the liberty of the country would be 

 effected by their sole individual exertions. 



Mina in this trying occasion exhibited the abilities for which he has 

 been so justly celebrated. He soon perceived that the odds were fear- 

 fully against him, and he prudently confined his operations to the avoid- 

 ing engaging in a contest until he could command greater elements of 

 success. He was surrounded with imminent dangers ; and to elude the 

 vigilance of the enemy was for the present moment the only advantage 

 to which he could aspire. In the art of fatiguing an enemy to no pur- 

 pose Mina is acknowledged a profound adept the extraordinary man- 

 ner in which he continued with his guerrilla to harass and exhaust the 

 strong French detachments opposed against him is in the memory of all 

 who are conversant with the history of the Peninsular war. The same 

 tactics would have been followed with equal success on the present oc- 

 casion, had not fatal and unavoidable circumstances deranged the plans 

 of Mina, and compromised his troops to a line of conduct contrary to the 

 wishes of their general as well as their own. 



The obstinacy of Colonel Valdes was productive of the most fatal 

 effects this chief must have been strangely deceived by the treacherous 

 informations of scouts in the interests of the enemy. Mina had received 

 intelligence of the real state of the case he knew that a formidable body 

 was on the point of falling upon the little army of the patriots, and he 

 hastened to communicate the news to Valdes. In the meantime he had 

 sent a great proportion of his troops to cover the retreat which he fore- 

 saw his companion in arms would be compelled to make. General Bu- 

 tron, who commanded Mina's followers, had an interview with Colonel 

 Valdes, and informed him that they would be surprised by the enemy 

 unless they made good their retreat in time. Valdes would not believe 

 the truth of this intelligence, alleging that he had received far more 

 correct information from his confidential scouts this fatal blindness 

 in Valdes was not long in producing the natural results. Early in the 

 morning of the 27th the enemy came in sight, and in a short time they 

 presented a very formidable array. Instead of detached guerrillas or 

 small flying columns it was soon perceived that a series of battalions of 

 regular troops were making their appearance. The troops of General 

 Llauder, Viceroy of Navarre, together with those of Fournay, Santos, 

 Ladron and Juanito, were acting with one accord, in order to surround 

 and completely annihilate the small band of the constitutionalists. 



To his first error Colonel Valdes added a second when he saw that 

 he had been mistaken in his surmises either from a punctilio of honor 

 from some extravagant stretch of hope, or from some other unknown 

 cause, he resolved to engage in conflict with the enemy, instead of 

 retreating before such superior force. This certainly was a strange in- 

 fatuation, the more reprehensible as no one ever entertained a doubt of 

 the intrepidity and military honour of Valdes. In a short time a brisk 



