Feb. 9, 1857.] RAWLINSON ON SOUTHERN PERSIA. 299 



and practicable for troops in every direction. Tt should be remembered, 

 indeed, that during the whole of the Affghan war we never had a reverse or 

 even a check in Western Affghanistan, with tlie exception of that single affair 

 of Sir Richard England's at Hykelzye ; so that it is hardly fair to place Herat 

 and Candahar in the same category with Cabul. At present the Persians are 

 in occnpation of Herat, and we are at war with Persia for the purpose of 

 compelling her to evacuate the city and restore it to the A Afghans. It is to 

 be hoj)ed, and I confidently expect, that the war will have that effect. But if 

 it be otherwise, if the Persians do not evacuate Herat, then comes the ques- 

 tion, what are we to do ? It is very currently believed that the forces sent 

 up the Gulf, are for the purpose of marching on Herat ; but that is an absurd 

 idea, that could never have entered into the imagination of any person ac- 

 quainted with the country. The country between Shiraz and Herat, being 

 for the most part a salt desert, is perfectly impracticable to an army ; but I 

 am not prepared to say that, in a geographical, physical, or military point of 

 view, there would be any difficulty in marching a force from our own Indian 

 frontiers to Herat, in order to expel the Persians from the city. I should be 

 sorry to see such a campaign undertaken, because of the expense ; but the 

 movement is perfectly practicable, and w^ould almost certainly be successful, if 

 we were content with the one definite object of recapturing Herat. In the 

 former Affghan war, all our disasters arose, it might be remembered, from 

 alterations of the original plan. Having marched through Affghanistan and 

 placed Shah Shuja on the throne, our work was accomplished, and we should 

 have retired, but, instead of returning, we remained in the country, and 

 thus exposed ourselves to disaster. In the same way, if we were now to march 

 upon Herat, and, having expelled the Persians, were to insist on remaining 

 in military occupation of the place, we might be subjected to great difficulties 

 on account of the exceptional position of the country. In England, we are apt 

 to forget that the social condition of Affghanistan, is different from that of any 

 other eastern country. Throughout Candahar and Herat, and partially in 

 Cabul, the lands are in possession of a privileged class, the Dorani aristocracy. 

 These chiefs possess great power, and are, in fact, the lords of the country, 

 holding their vast estates on a sort of feudal tenure, and having the peasantry 

 under them. Now the Doranis would necessarily be put on one side, if 

 we were to assume the government of the country ; and foreseeing their 

 fate, they would thus be predisposed to become our enemies. It would be 

 vain indeed to attempt to hold the country, unless the Doranis were removed ; 

 and although the Persians might not scruple to undertake such a work of 

 depopulation, the English of course could not accept its responsibility. In 

 the times of Sennacherib and Tiglathpaleser, such things were often clone, — 

 whole nations were transported fr m one country to another, and similar 

 means are still occasionally resorted to in the East, for taming a turbulent 

 population. But the British Government, in the nineteenth century, could not 

 of course be a party to any such proceeding. I repeat, therefore, in con- 

 clusion, that if we are content to march on Herat, expel the Persians, and 

 return to India, there is no difficulty or danger in the enterprise ; but that, 

 if we attempt to retain a permanent footing in the country, we shall inevitably 

 incur disaster. 



The President, in conveying the expression of the thanks of the meeting 

 to Sir Henry Rawlinson, regretted that the lateness of the hour alone (it being 

 near eleven o'clock) prevented a more lengthy discussion on the subject then 

 under notice. He saw present several travellers wlio, from their personal 

 knowledge of the country, could no doubt have afforded them very valuable 

 information. He must, however, adjourn the meeting until the 23rd instant. 



