75 



Whatever then made the infliction of the penalty of death 

 doubtful was a direct encouragement to the perpetration of 

 murder. It was notorious that many enormous criminals got 

 off on the clearest evidence, from the dislike entertained by 

 some (persons, and the religious scruples of others, ever to 

 bring in any man guilty of death. 



Mischance was now confidently reckoned upon by deliberate 

 murderers. 



Such scruples it is said would not exist were the penalty of 

 a lower order. It was argued therefore that such reduction 

 ought to take place. 



He fully allowed the force of the objection, but he could 

 not consent to give it any practical weight. It was not the 

 jury who condemned to death. They merely were required to 

 give their opinion on the strength of the evidence laid before 

 them whether it were conclusive, or otherwise. 



If they knowingly violated their oath, and '' laid perjury to 

 their soul,'^ he thought the sooner the constitution of juries 

 was altered, the better. We had lately seen in a sister country 

 the effect of this deliberate perjury in trials for treason. 



Such intention arose not from repugnance to the penalty, 

 but from sympathy with the offenders ; and the general outcry 

 was that the constitution of the juries required attention, not 

 that the criminals should be pardoned. 



The feelings, therefore, of a few individuals formed no 

 reason for altering the deliberate conviction of the many. 



If however the few increased in numbers and strength, if 

 they continued practically to encourage murder by refusing to 

 bear their share in its punishment — if they continued to spread 

 their own views successfully amongst the ranks from which 

 juries were principally taken — if they, in fine, persisted in 

 obstructing the course of the law with increasing pertinacity — 

 he was perfectly willing to allow that some alteration wjis 

 demanded. 



The people of England (in the persons of their legislators) 



