MONTHLY REVIEW OF LITERATURE. 405 



sideration of foreign affairs by the ministers of the day, while the discussion 

 of home-grievances was only occasionally and then feebly kept up by an insigni- 

 ficant minority in the legislature. The reverse has happened lately : a long- 

 continued peace has diverted our attention from the continent to the concerns 

 of our own country ; public indignation has raised its voice against internal 

 abuses, and reforms of our ecclesiastical, legislative, and executive departments 

 have for the last six or eight years been themes of absorbing interest in and 

 out of parliament to the exclusion of international politics. We quite agree 

 with the writer of the pamphlet, that the extreme on either side is bad, and 

 that if the foreign affairs of the British empire had been conducted with the 

 same diplomatic tact and ability that characterises the policy of more than 

 one of the continental courts, it would have been well for England. Lord 

 Palmerston and all his train are quite inadequate to cope with the gigantic 

 we will not say, virtuously- motived diplomacy of a Nicholas, a Philippe, 

 and a Metternich. Although we do not think with the author that our 

 foreign policy could ever be managed, so as to be " totally independent of 

 party politics''' we still contend for the necessity of reducing such transac- 

 tions to something like a system, and of appointing to diplomatic stations 

 abroad such persons as are fitted by a special education for the duties of their 

 profession, persons regularly examined and approved ; and we doubt, whe- 

 ther any single individual is sufficient to manage the responsible business of 

 the foreign office with satisfaction to himself and with benefit or credit to the 

 nation. 



Although we willingly concede to the author of these pages a claim to 

 shrewdness and ingenuity, we do not agree in his conclusions respecting 

 what ought to be our foreign policy ; but, in order to express our objections 

 properly, it will be at least fair to put our readers previously in possession of 

 the views explained in the pamphlet. 



In page forty we read as follows : 



" It has indeed long been evident to every one who has paid the least atten- 

 tion to the subject that henceforth the duty of a British statesman must be to 

 counteract the designs of Russia. The only difference of opinion is respecting 

 the best way of counteracting these designs, and an alliance with France has 

 been much boasted of as the only effectual remedy to be employed. Now my 

 firm conviction is, that not the least dependence can be placed on France ; for, 

 although it may be against her interests to suffer Russia to gain possession of 

 Turkey (a point which, however, is very questionable), it would be equally 

 against her interests to assist England in crushing that power. An ambitious 

 French monarch would prefer allowing the czar to extend his dominions to their 

 natural limits, provided he would allow him to do the same in regard to France, 

 the natural limits of both countries to be defined of course according to cir- 

 cumstances. The interests of France are too diametrically opposed to those 

 of England, and too susceptible of coalescing with those of Russia by means 

 of a few mutual concessions, for a British minister to place the least confi- 

 dence in the professions and promises of a Louis Philippe. If, then, no con- 

 fidence can be placed in France, if, in case of war, we are more likely to have 

 France for an enemy than for an ally, if, as I have attempted to show, it 

 would be even better to have her for an enemy, where are we to seek for our 

 allies ? I answer that on the one hand we ought to form the closest alliance with 

 Spain and Portugal, which will enable us to keep France in check, and on the 

 other hand with the German and Scandinavian states, which alliances will 

 serve us equally against France and Russia. With Turkey, and the states of 

 Central Asia, we ought to form more than an alliance we ought to take them 

 under our protection. These are the only alliances we can form which can be 

 grounded on mutual interests, and therefore the only durable ones. Spain 

 has more to fear from France than from us, and to this is joined a national 

 prejudice which the Spaniards have against the French, a prejudice which will 

 always work in our favour, and which it will always be well to keep up. The 



M.M. No. 4. 2 G 



