HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 351 



cloud. Thus the results of meditation, having prevailed over the 

 senses, compelled them to submit to an interdiction from the belief of 

 the truth of their perceptions. Here the doctrine of idealism, the 

 apparent end of long systems of philosophy, appears to be the point 

 from which they started, when the inexperienced mind sought for the 

 first principles of science and had no means of executing its arduous 

 task, but by trusting to its own bold conceptions and conscious strength. 



The Maharabat, one of the sacred books of India, puts these words 

 into the mouth of Schah Palak : " The senses are but the instruments 

 of the soul; it can derive no knowledge through their channel." The 

 system of emanation was common to the Egyptians, the Pho3nicians, 

 the Chaldeans, the Persians, and the Indians. Idealism was adopted 

 by the sages of these two latter people, served for the base of their 

 doctrines, and is still retained in India by the Brahmins of the highest 

 caste. 



These primitive philosophers seem then to have instituted a sort of 

 psychology, but which was at its origin, like all other sciences, almost 

 entirely speculative. Its end seemed rather to be the explanation of 

 the nature of the mind than to observe the laws to which its powers 

 are subjected. 



The hypothesis which spiritualised the whole universe, which gave 

 a soul to animals, to plants, to the elements themselves, and supposed 

 a direct communication between the Omniscient and Almighty Being 

 and the human mind, was favourable to the doctrines of divination. 

 Superstitious practices, enhanced in authority by the mysterious so- 

 lemnities which accompanied them, became a part of religion, and 

 were confounded with it. Hence the success of magic, and its im- 

 portant place in the worship of antiquity. The astonishing and rapid 

 progress of these mystic doctrines is to be attributed in part to the 

 privileged character of the initiated, in part to their being favour- 

 able to the presumption of man's aspirations. 



Such are the first hypotheses of philosophy of which we possess any 

 written record. They are wonderful for their hardihood and gran- 

 deur ; and, like all monuments of antiquity, are admired by modern 

 sophists for the gigantic proportions which are not to be found in their 

 own comparatively puny conceptions. 



When nature first offered itself to the views of reason, it took 

 two general forms, both the offspring of the imagination. The one 

 consisted in establishing laws of universal application; the other in 

 giving an intellectual character to sensible phenomena. But, together 

 with these general forms, two particular orders of knowledge arose 

 and obtained a specific and individual character, namely, ethics and 

 mathematics. Their invention and progress are to be assigned to 

 especial causes. They both enjoy this advantage they can dispense 

 with external aid, and only require the assistance of solitary medita- 

 tion and profound thought. 



The science of ethics can scarcely be called the creature of inven- 

 tion. It is an innate feeling, a " still small voice," to which, in a 

 greater or less degree, we must all lend our attention. It is the 

 most noble impulse of nature, to which the knowledge of what is 

 good only adds the desire of attaining that which is better. 



