102 Dr WHEWELL, on THE PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS. 



for I am here One of us seven. So that both are true. And so if any one say that stocks and 

 stones, and the like, are both one and many,' — not saying that Oneness is Maniness, nor Mani- 

 ness Oneness, he says nothing wonderful : he says what all will allow. (^ 8.) If then, as I 

 said before, any one should take separately the Ideas or Essence of Things, as Likeness and 

 Unlikeness, Maniness and Oneness, Rest and Motion, and the like, and then should shew that 

 these can mix and separate again, I should be wonderfully surprised, O Zeno : for I reckon 

 that I have tolerably well made myself master of these subjects*. I should be much more 

 surprised if any one could shew me this contradiction involved in the Ideas themselves ; in 

 the object of the Reason, as well as in Visible objects." 



It may be remarked that Socrates delivers all this argumentation with the repetitions 

 which it involves, and the vehemence of its manner, without waiting for a reply to any of his 

 interrogations; instead of making every step the result of a concession of his opponent, as 

 is the case in the Dialogues where he is represented as triumphant. Every reader of Plato will 

 recollect also that in those Dialogues, the triumph of temper on the part of Socrates is represented 

 as still more remarkable than the triumph of argument. No vehemence or rudeness on the 

 part of his adversaries prevents his calmly following his reasoning ; and he parries coarse- 

 ness by compliment. Now in this Dialogue, it is remarkable that this kind cff triumph is given 

 to the adversaries of Socrates. " When Socrates had thus delivered himself," says Pythodorus, 

 the narrator of the conversation, " we thought that Parmenides and Zeno would both be 

 angry. But it was not so. They bestowed entire attention upon him, and often looked at each 

 other, and smiled, as in admiration of Socrates. And when he had ended, Parmenides said : ' O 

 Socrates, what an admirable person you are, for the earnestness with which you reason ! Tell 

 me then, Do you then believe the doctrine to which you have been referring ; — that there 

 are certain Ideas, existing independent of Things; and that there are, separate from the Ideas, 

 Things which partake of them ? And do you think that there is an Idea of Likeness besides 

 the likeness which we have ; and a Oneness and a Maniness, and the like ? And an Idea of 

 the Right, and the Good, and the Fair, and of other such qualities?'" Socrates says that he 

 does hold this ; Parmenides then asks him, how far he carries this doctrine of Ideas, and 

 propounds to him the difficulties which I have already stated ; and when Socrates is unable to 

 answer him, lets him off in the kind but patronizing way which I have already described. 



To me, comparing this with the intellectual and moral attitude of Socrates in the most 

 dramatic of the other Platonic Dialogues, it is inconceivable, that this representation of Socrates 

 should be Plato's. It is just what Zeno would have written, if he had wished to bestow 

 upon his master Parmenides the calm dignity and irresistible argument which Plato assigns 

 to Socrates. And this character is kept up to the end of the Dialogue. When Socrates 

 (^ 19) has acknowledged that he is at a loss which way to turn for his philosophy, Parmenides 

 undertakes, though with kind words, to explain to him by what fundamental error in the course 

 of his speculative habits he has been misled. He says ; " You try to make a complete 



• I am aware that this translation is different from the | of my view ; but I do not conceive that the argument would 

 common translation. It appears to me to be consistent with I be perceptibly weaker, if the common interpretation were 

 the habit of the Greek language. It slightly leans in favour I adopted. 



