100 Dr WHEWELL, on the PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS. 



This argument drives Socrates from the position that Ideas are Thoughts, and he moves 

 to another, that they are Paradigms, Exemplars of the qualities of things, to which the things 

 themselves are like, and their being thus like, is their participating in the Idea. But here too, 

 he has no better success. Parmenides argues thus : 



" If the Object be like the Idea, the Idea must be like the Object. And since the Object 

 and the Idea are like, they must, according to your doctrine, participate in the Idea of Like- 

 ness. And thus you have one Idea participating in another Idea, and so on in infinitum." 

 Socrates is obliged to allow that this demolishes the notion of objects partaking in their Ideas 

 by likeness: and that he must seek some other way. "You see then, O Socrates," says 

 Parmenides, " what difficulties follow, if any one asserts the independent existence of Ideas ! " 

 Socrates allows that this is true. " And yet," says Parmenides, " you do not half perceive the 

 difficulties which follow from this doctrine of Ideas." Socrates expresses a wish to know to 

 what Parmenides refers ; and the aged sage replies by explaining that if Ideas exist inde- 

 pendently of us, we can never know anything about them : and that even the Gods could not 

 know anything about man. This argument, though somewhat obscure, is evidently stated 

 with perfect earnestness, and Socrates is represented as giving his assent to it. " And yet," 

 says Parmenides, (end of & 18) "if any one gives up entirely the doctrine of Ideas, how is 

 any reasoning possible ?" 



All the way through this discussion, Parmenides appears as vastly superior to Socrates ; as 

 seeing completely the tendency of every line of reasoning, while Socrates is driven blindly 

 from one position to another ; and as kindly and graciously advising a young man respecting 

 the proper aims of his philosophical career ; as well as clearly pointing out the consequences 

 of his assumptions. Nothing can be more complete than the higher position assigned to Par- 

 menides in the Dialogue. 



This has not been overlooked by the Editors and Commentators of Plato. To take for 

 example one of the latest ; in Steinhart's Introduction to Hieronymus Miiller's translation of 

 Parmenides (Leipzig, 1852), p. 26l, he says: "It strikes us, at first, as strange, that Plato 

 here seems to come forward as the assailant of his own doctrine of Ideas. For the difficulties 

 which he makes Parmenides propound against that doctrine are by no means sophistical or 

 superficial, but substantial and to the point. Moreover there is among all these objections, which 

 are partly derived from the Megarics, scarce one which does not appear again in the penetrat- 

 ing and comprehensive argumentations of Aristotle against the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas." 



Of course, both this writer and other commentators on Plato offer something as a solution 

 of this difficulty. But though these explanations are subtle and ingenious, they appear to leave 

 no satisfactory or permanent impression on the mind. I must avow that, to me, they appear 

 insufficient and empty ; and I cannot help believing that the solution is of a more simple and 

 direct kind. It may seem bold to maintain an opinion different from that of so many eminent 

 scholars; but I think that the solution which I offer, will derive confirmation from a consi- 

 deration of the whole Dialogue ; and therefore I shall venture to propound it in a distinct 

 and positive form. It is this: 



I conceive that the Parmenides is not a Platonic Dialogue at all ; but Antiplatonic, or 

 more properly, Eleatic: written, not by Plato, in order to explain and prove his Theory of 



