98 dk whewell, on the platonic theory of ideas. 



such Ideas as Man, and Fire, and Water. Parmenides, proceeding in the same line, pushes 

 him further still. " Do you doubt," says he, " whether there are Ideas of things apparently 

 worthless and vile? Is there an Idea of a Hair? of Mud? of Filth?" Socrates has not the 

 courage to accept such an extension of the theory. He says, " By no means. These are 

 not Ideas. These are nothing more than just what we see them. I have often been perplexed 

 what to think on this subject. But after standing to this a while, I have fled the thought, for 

 fear of falling into an unfathomable abyss of absurdities." On this, Parmenides rebukes him 

 for his want of consistency. " Ah Socrates," he says, " you are yet young; and philosophy 

 has not yet taken possession of you as I think she will one day do — when you will have 

 learned to find nothing despicable in any of these things. But now your youth inclines you 

 to regard the opinions of men." It is indeed plain, that if we are to assume an Idea of a 

 Chair or a Table, we can find no boundary line which will exclude Ideas of everything for 

 which we have a name, however worthless or offensive. And this is an argument against the 

 assumption of such Ideas, which will convince most persons of the groundlessness of the 

 assumption : — the more so, as for the assumption of such Ideas, it does not appear that Plato 

 offers any argument whatever; nor does this assumption solve any problem, or remove any 

 difficulty*. Parmenides, then, had reason to say that consistency required Socrates, if he 

 assumed any such Ideas, to assume all. And I conceive his reply to be to this effect; and to 

 be thus a reductio ad absurdum of the Theory of Ideas in this sense. According to the 

 opinions of those who see in the Parmenides an exposition of Platonic doctrines, I believe that 

 Parmenides is conceived in this passage, to suggest to Socrates what is necessary for the com- 

 pletion of the Theory of Ideas. But upon either supposition, I wish especially to draw the 

 attention of my readers to the position of superiority in the Dialogue in which Parmenides is 

 here placed with regard to Socrates. 



Parmenides then proceeds to propound to Socrates difficulties with regard to the Ideal 

 Theory, in another of its aspects ; — namely, when it assumes Ideas of Relations of things ; 

 and here also, I wish especially to have it considered how far the answers of Socrates to these 

 objections are really satisfactory and conclusive. 



" Tell me," says he (§ 10, Bekker), "You conceive that there are certain Ideas, and that 

 things partaking of these Ideas, are called by the corresponding names ;■ — an Idea of Likeness, 

 things partaking of which are called Like; — o{ Greatness, whence they are Great: of Beauty, 

 whence they are Beautiful?" Socrates assents, naturally: this being the simple and universal 

 statement of the Theory, in this case. But then comes one of the real difficulties of the 

 Theory. Since the special things participate of the General Idea, has each got the whole of 

 the Idea, which is, of course, One; or has each a part of the Idea? " For," says Parmenides, 

 " can there be any other way of participation than these two .''" Socrates replies by a simili- 

 tude : " The Idea, though One, may be wholly in each object, as the Day, one and the same, 

 is wholly in each place." The physical illustration, Parmenides damages by making it more 

 physical still. "You are ingenious, Socrates," he says, (§ 11) "in making the same thing be in 



• Prof. Butler, Lect. ix. Second Series, p. 136, appears to I for the assumption of such Ideas ; but I see no trace of 

 think that Plato had sufficient grounds (of a theological kind) | them. 



