Dr WHEWELL, on the PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS. 95 



presents "no incredible account" of the subject; that a fifth is "no preposterous notion in 

 substance, and no unwarrantable form of phrase." Divested of these modest formulae, his 

 account is as follows: [Vol. ii. p. 117.] 



*' Man's soul is made to contain not merely a consistent scheme of its own notions, but a 

 direct apprehension of real and eternal laws beyond it. These real and eternal laws are 

 things intelligible, and not things sensible. 



" These laws impressed upon creation by its Creator, and apprehended by man, are some- 

 thing distinct equally from the Creator and from man, and the whole mass of them may 

 fairly be termed the World of Things Intelligible. 



" Further, there are qualities in the supreme and ultimate Cause of all, which are mani- 

 fested in His creation, and not merely manifested, but, in a manner — after being brought out 

 of his superessential nature into the stage of being [which is] below him, but next to him — 

 are then by the causative act of creation deposited in things, differencing them one from the 

 other, so that the things partake of them (/meTe'x^ovai), communicate with them {KOivcovovai)' 



" The intelligence of man, excited to reflection by the impressions of these objects thus 

 (though themselves transitory) participant of a divine quality, may rise to higher conceptions of 

 the perfections thus faintly exhibited; and inasmuch as these perfections are unquestionably 

 real existences, and known to be such in the very act of contemplation, — this may be 

 regarded as a direct intellectual apperception of them, — a Union of the Reason with the 

 Ideas in that sphere of being which is common to both. 



" Finally, the Reason, in proportion as it learns to contemplate the Perfect and Eternal, 

 desires the enjoyment of such contemplations in a more consummate degree, and cannot be 

 fully satisfied, except in the actual fruition of the Perfect itself. 



" These suppositions, taken together, constitute the Theory of Ideas." 



In remarking upon the theory thus presented, I shall abstain from any discussion of the 

 theological part of it, as a subject which would probably be considered as unsuited to the 

 meetings of this Society, even in its most purely philosophical form. But I conceive that it 

 will not be inconvenient, if it be not wearisome, to discuss the Theory of Ideas as an attempt 

 to explain the existence of real knowledge ; which Prof. Butler very rightly considers as the 

 necessary aim of this and cognate systems of philosophy*. 



I conceive, then, that one of the primary objects of Plato's Theory of Ideas is, to 

 explain the existence of real knowledge, that is, of demonstrated knowledge, such as the 

 propositions of geometry offer to us. In this view, the Theory of Ideas is one attempt to 

 solve a problem, much discussed in our times, What is the ground of geometrical truth ? I 

 do not mean that this is the whole object of the Theory, or the highest of its claims. As I 

 have said, I omit its theological bearings; and I am aware that there are passages in the 

 Platonic Dialogues, in which the Ideas which enter into the apprehension and demonstration of 

 geometrical truths are spoken of as subordinate to Ideas which have a theological aspect. 

 But I have no doubt that one of the main motives to the construction of the Theory of Ideas 



* P. 116. "No amount of human knowledge can be adequate which does not solve the phenomena of these absolute certainties." 



