338 



Mr DE morgan, ON THE SYLLOGISM, No. IV, 



major, and an assertion that the relations so introduced into his principium exist in the 

 exemplum before him, for his minor. But though this evasion — it is nothing else — is 

 practised, and serves to hide the insufficiency of the onymatic syllogism, it is not distinctly 

 proclaimed, and universally applied. When I first challenged the reduction to an Aris- 

 totelian syllogism of the inference that some must have both coats and waistcoats if most 

 have coats and most have waistcoats, I supposed that among the attempts to answer would 

 be the following: — 'Two terms each of which has more than half the extent of a third term 

 are terms which have some common extent ; the men who have coats and the men who have 

 waistcoats are two terms each of which has more than half the extent of a third term ; 

 therefore the men who have coats and the men who have waistcoats are terms which have some 

 common extent.' Hut this was not brought forward : though it had as much right to appear 

 as the following. Reid denied that ' A = B, B = C, therefore A = C is a (common) syllo- 

 gism. True, says one able expounder, because it is elliptical: true, says another, because it 

 is material. Both render it into what they call true logical form as follows : — Things equal 

 to the same are things equal to one another ; A and B are things equal to the same ; therefore 

 A and B are things equal to one another. I pass over the assertion that A = B &c. is an 

 ellipsis of this last, as not worth answer: the imputed material character requires further 

 consideration. 



When it shall be clearly pointed out, by definite precept and sufficiently copious ex- 

 ample, what the logicians really mean by the distinction of form and matter, I may be able 

 to deal with the question more definitely than I can do at this time. Dr Thomson {Outlines, 

 &c., § 15) remarks that they seldom or never talk much about the distinction without* con- 

 fusion. I can but ask what is that notion of form as opposed to matter on which it 

 can be denied that ' A = B, B = C, .'. A = C is as pure a form of thought, apart from 

 matter, as ' A is B, B is C, .•. A is C In both there is matter implied in A, B, C : 

 but in both this matter is vague, all that is definite being the sameness of the matter of 

 A, &c. in all places in which the symbol occurs. In both there is a law of thought appealed 

 to on primary subjective testimony of consciousness; 'equal of equal is equal' in the first; 

 ' identical of identical is identical' in the second. These two laws are equally necessary, 

 equally self-evident, equally incapable of demonstration out of more simple elements. Does 



" Because there really is not much to talk about : the sepa- 

 ration is soon conceived, and soon made ; and the work begins 

 when, after separation, the analysis of the things separated is 

 attempted. There is much detail in cookery, much in shoe- 

 making, if we start from the raw flesh and the raw hide. The 

 separation of these parts of the animal is easily seen to be 

 wanted and easily made; any very great talk about it can have 

 no effect, unless it be to give a chance of leather steaks and 

 beef shoes. One of the oldest of the schoolmen, John of Sa- 

 lisbury — whose date may be remembered by the record that 

 tacilus, sed mcerens, conlinuo se subduxit, when Thomas-a- 

 Becket was killed by his side — says nearly as much as need 

 be said, as follows; — " At qui lineam, aut superficiem attendit 

 sine corpore, formam utique contemplationis oculo a materia 

 desjungit; cum tamen sine materia forma esse non possit. 

 Kon tamen formam sine materia esse abstrahens hie concipit 



jntellectus (compositus enim esset) sed simpliciter alterum 

 sine altero, cum tamen sine altero esse non possit, intuetur. 

 Nee hoc quidem simplicitati ejus praejudicat, sed eo simpli- 

 cior est, quo simpliciora, sine aliorum admixtione, perspicit 

 singulatim. Hoc autem naturee rerum non adversatur, quae 

 ad sui investigationem banc potestatem contulit intellectui, ut 

 possit conjuncta disjungere, et desjuncta conjungere." (Meta- 

 logicxis, Lib. ii. cap. 20). Add to this illustration from the 

 original meaning of the terms the extension of the words 

 matter and /orm to any distinction between the quod se habet 

 and the modus se habendi, as also to the distinction of ope- 

 ration and operated on, and the two words may then take 

 leave of each other. But when form and matter are to be 

 adapted to the defence of the existing mode of distinction, 

 it is no wonder if they must be hammered until the anvil 

 is hot. 



