326 DR DONALDSON, ON THE WORD ARGUMENT, 



the trouble which I have bestowed upon it. These results have a double reference: (l) to 

 comparative philology ; (2) to the terminology of science. 



(1) As a question of comparative philology, it is absolutely necessary that something 

 should be done to correct the current statements about arguo and argutua, which are really 

 "Msgraceful to Latin lexicography. For while Ramshorn connects arguo with the German 

 wahren or gewahren {Lat. Synon. p. l6), and Benfey, who etymologizes through a brick-wall, 

 does not hesitate to connect it with the Greek eXey-^^w, and the Sanscrit glaksh (Wurxelle.v. ii. 

 p. S67), Doderlein, who saw long ago that the full form must have been ar-gruere, not only fell 

 into the error of supposing that gruo was another way of writing ruo {Et. u. Syn. ii. p. l62), 

 but has gone back to Voss's derivation from the Greek apyoa, which is also adopted by Pott 

 (Etym. Forsch. i. 25), and even supposes two homonyms arguo, " to make plain," from apyow, 

 and arguo, " to accuse," from adgrvo {Et. u. Syn. v. p. 36o). With all this the word argutus 

 remains unexplained ; and in the interests of scientific etymology I consider it quite worth 

 while to follow out to its logical consequences the simple reasoning that arguo is argruo or 

 adgruo ; that as congruo is undoubtedly equivalent to avyKoovw, ingruo and, therefore, adgrvo 

 must be compounded of the same verb ; and that argutus, being the Latin congener of eVi- 

 KpovcTTOi, must mean beaten or sounded, and, by implication, emitting a clear, ringing sound. 

 And these results are in strict accordance with the classical usage of the words. 



(2) As a question of scientific terminology, I consider it of importance that all words 

 used in exact science should be themselves exact and definite. I have nothing to do with the 

 popular applications of the word argument. L^sage and convention are the only criteria in 

 that case. Let the word argument be employed by poets and prose writers in every sense 

 which is found to be intelligible. But let us protest against the misuse, or the confused, 

 vague, and contradictory uses, of the word as a scientific term by scientific men. Let us 

 require of those who profess to speak correctly, that they should confine the term argument to 

 its proper value, namely, a proof, or means of proving, a test, a ground of inference; and that 

 they should not make it coextensive with argumentation, reasoning, and the formal process of 

 proving. Above all, let us be prepared to rebuke and correct any logician who tells us, as 

 Dr Whately does, that in " the strict technical sense," " every argument consists of two parts ; 

 that which is proved, and that by means of which it is proved," whereas " in popular use the 

 word argument is often employed to denote the latter of these two parts alone." As if, forsooth, 

 popular use confined a word to one definite meaning, whereas formal logic was permitted to 

 use one and the same word as a capricious homonym ! There can be no tyranny surely in 

 demanding that the logician should, like his best predecessors, use the term argument to denote 

 the middle term only, namely, the term used for proof, and that all scientific men should, like 

 our mathematicians, be satisfied with the oldest and still most common signification of the 

 word, namely, the means of testing the soundness of a conclusion, the touchstone of the validity 

 of our reasoning. 



24 Sept. 1859. 



