322 DR DONALDSON, ON THE ORIGIN AND 



eXoTToi'coi' ^ e^ wv o vowtos (rvWoyi<jfx6i, i- e. " it follows that the enthymeme and the ex- 

 ample, which are, the one a sort of syllogism, and the other a sort of induction, are generally 

 conversant with contingent propositions, and composed of few of these, and oftener fewer than 

 the syllogism in its original form contains." From this description it was supposed that the 

 enthymeme differed from a syllogism by regularly suppressing one of its premises. But Julius 

 Pacius*, after him Facciolati ■{•, and finally Mr De Quinceyj, have shown beyond all question 

 that this accident, which might happen to a logical syllogism, and which Aristotle describes 

 as " frequent," and not invariable, cannot be the essential distinction of an enthymeme, which 

 must consist in the nature of the matter, — that of the syllogism being fixed and apodeictic, 

 that of the enthymeme probable and drawn from the province of opinion. As Aristotle him- 

 self says in his Prior Analytics (ii. c. 27, p. 70 a. 10): evOvfxriiid tart avWoyiafio^ e^ ei/corwi/ 

 ^ <Tt]fxei(i)v, which Sir W. Hamilton renders, " enthymeme is distinguished from pure syllogism 

 as a reasoning of peculiar matter from signs and likelihoods." And in accordance with this, 

 while Aristotle says (p. 1355 a. 6), ean S' d-n-o^ei^t^ pijToptKrj evBvuritia : he also says (1359 A. 7), 

 Ta yap TeKfxtjpia Kal Tci e'lKora Kal tu (Ttjue'ia irpoTaaeK eurl pr/ropiKal (cf. p. 1357 A. S2). 



The frequent abridgment of the enthymeme arises from its matter, as appears from the 

 illustration given by Aristotle in the passage already quoted from his Rhetoric. " If," he 

 says, " any of these — the contingent propositions that make up the enthymeme — be known, 

 it is not necessary to mention it, as the hearer may supply it himself. For instance, to convey 

 the information that Dorieus was conqueror in a contest where a chaplet is the prize, it is 

 sufficient to say that he conquered in the Olympic games: but it is needless to add that the 

 Olympic games confer such a prize as a chaplet ; for every body knows that." If we put 

 the syllogism here represented in its full form, it would be of course 

 The Olympic games are a crowned contest; 

 Dorieus conquered at the Olympic games; 

 Therefore he won a chaplet. 

 But the enthymeme or rhetorical proof would be sufficiently expressed if we said, " Dorieus 

 has got a crown, for he has conquered at Olympia." And as the argument or middle term 

 is the only point of importance, the enthymeme generally contents itself with this brief state- 

 ment of the reasoning implied. The definition, then, given by Julius Pacius {Institutiones 

 Logicce, p. 67) is quite correct: " Enfhymema est syllogismus ex verisimilibus, vel signis vel 

 indiciis, in quo plerumque altera propositio omittitur, tanquam nota." Thus to take one of 

 his examples, the enthymeme is expressed fully and syllogistically, if we say: 



Pittacus est probus; 

 Pittacus est sapiens; 

 Ergo, Sapientes sunt probi. 

 But the more common way of putting it would be as a mere argument : Sapientes sunt probi, 

 nam Pittacus est probus, which of course does not prove the necessity, but only the possibility, 

 ot at most the probability of the conclusion. It is scarcely necessary to add that the four 

 kinds of arguments which are generally used in rhetoric, the argumenta ad verecundiam, ad 



* De enthymemate. f Orut. xil. Aoroases, &c. Patavii, 1759, p. 227. t Blackwood's Magazine, xxiv. p. 887. 



