PROPER USE OF THE WORD ARGUMENT. 321 



perly defined as the seat of the argumentum, where it lies hid and may be found, or in other 

 words, the place in which we looii for middle terms. Thus Cicero says {Top. c. 2): " cum 

 pervestigare argumentum aliquod volumus, locos nosse debemus,..Itaque licet definire locum 

 esse argumenti sedem." Similarly, Quintilian, /. O. v. 10, ^ 20: "locos appello sedes argu- 

 mentorum, in quibus latent, ex quibus sunt petenda." And again (v. 12, ^ 17): " ipsas argu- 

 mentorum velut sedes non me quidem omnes ostendisse confido, plurimas tamen." Now there 

 must be an argument or middle term for every kind of syllogism. Therefore there must be 

 TOTToi or " places" in demonstrative as well as probable reasoning; and in point of fact the 

 axiom is the tottos in the demonstrative syllogism, just as the common places, or general prin- 

 ciples of probability, are the seats of arguments in the probable syllogism. In fact, every 

 general statement or common principle might be called a tottos or aToi-^eiov. But the inves- 

 tigation of arguments in scientific demonstration belongs to the different sciences, and cannot 

 be discussed generally. So that practically the art of topics belongs only to a " probable," or, 

 as Aristotle calls it, " dialectical and rhetorical " argumentation. Thus Aristotle says {Rhet. 

 I. 2, § 21): Xt-'yo) cidXeKTiKow Kal prjTopiKovs avWoyidfji.ovs etvai Trepi wv tous tottovi Xe- 

 yofjisv, " I call dialectical and rhetorical synonyms those in reference to which we use the 

 expression places." And again (ii. 26, § l): ecrTj yap cjToi-^tfiov Ka\ tottos els o iroWa ev- 

 duixrifiara efnriirTet, " an element or place is that which contains several rhetorical arguments." 

 And as distinguished from e'l^r] he says of the tottoi of rhetoric {Rhet. i. 2, § 22): KaOairep ovv 

 Kal ev TOts ToTTJicoIs Kal evravOa otaipeTeov toii/ evOvfirinaTiov to. t6 e'iori Kal Toiis tottou^ 

 f^ lov XrjTTTeov. Xe'yo) oe e'lot] fxev ra^ KaO eKaaTov yevo^ ioias irpoTaaeK, tottohs oe tous 

 Koivovi ofxoiwi irdvTwi', " as in the Topics we must distinguish here the species and the places 

 from which we may derive our arguments. Now I give the name of species to the propositions 

 peculiar to the several kinds of rhetoric, and that of places to those which are common to all 

 alike." I have rendered the term evOvur/na by " argument," because although an enthymeme 

 may be formally expressed as a regular syllogism, it is generally put as a mere argument or 

 reason why. Thus we may say, " Ca;sar was justly killed, because he was a tyrant ;" or, 

 "And I will tell you the reason why, — he was a tyrant," which is equivalent to: 



Csesar was a tyrant ; 



Tyrants are justly slain ; " 



Therefore Caesar was justly slain. 

 The middle term here is " tyrant," which is the argumentum of the syllogism ; and the 

 common-place is " tyrannicide is justifiable." In ordinary conversation the enthymeme or sen- 

 timent is used indifi'erently for the argument and the place of the argument. And hence it 

 is that "argument" and "topic" are used without distinction to signify the theme or sub- 

 ject of a composition, the essential purport of a discourse. The passage in which Aristotle 

 most directly contrasts the enthymeme or " sentiment " with the syllogism or " process of 

 reasoning" has given rise to a great deal of discussion. The words {Rhet. i. 2, § 13) are as 

 follows. After pointing out briefly the unsuitableness of the strictly logical syllogism and 

 induction to the ordinary purposes of persuasion, the philosopher adds : war avayKa'iov to 

 T6 ev9vfxri/xa eivai Kal to irapdoeiyti.a irepl twv evSeyoiievwv w Ta ■TroXXa e^eii; Kal aXXws" 

 TO nev irapaoeiyfxa eiraywyijv' to ^ evOv/urjiua avWoyia/mov' Kal eg oXiywi> re koi iroXXaKit 



41—2 



