PROFESSOR THOMPSON, ON THE GENUINENESS OF THE SOPHISTA, &c. 147 



friendly, but always a rigorous and searching critique of the doctrines of these schools, the 

 relation of which to each other is traced with as firm a hand, as that of each one to the scheme 

 which Plato proposes as their substitute. These positions I shall endeavour to substantiate 

 hereafter, but I shall first produce positive external evidence of the authenticity of the dialogue 

 under review. 



1. The most unexceptionable witness to the genuineness of a Platonic dialogue is, I pre- 

 sume, his pupil and not over-friendly critic Aristotle. Allusions to the writings of Plato abound 

 in the works of this philosopher, of which the industry of commentators has revealed manv, and 

 has probably some left to reveal. These allusions are frequently open and acknowledged; the 

 author is often, the dialogue occasionally named': but in the greater number of instances no 

 mention occurs either of author or dialogue, and the (pacri Tives of the philosopher has to be 

 interpreted by the sagacity of his readers or commentators. I shall begin with an instance of 

 the last kind, where however the identity of phraseology enables us to identify the quotation. 

 In the treatise De Anima, iii. 3. 9, we read thus: (pavepov on ovSe So^a fxer alaBtjaeoos 

 ovce 01 a'lcrOijcrewi, OV06 cvixTrXoKtj oo^r/^ Kai a'laOtjcreMs (pavTaaia ai> e'ltj. A "combi- 

 nation of judgment and sensation" is evidently the same thing as "judgment with sensation;" 

 why then this tautology ? It is explained by a reference to Plato's Sophista, ^ 107, p. 264 b, 

 where we are told that the mental state denoted in a previous sentence by the verb (paiverai, 

 is "a mixture of sensation and judgment," au/jL/uLi^is aiaOijcrewi kuI ^o^jys; and just before, that 

 when a judgment is formed, one of the terms of which is an object present at the time to the 

 senses, we may properly denote such judgment as a (pavTacria- ''Orav ixrj Kaff avrrjv aWd 

 oi aicrOrjaews iraprj Ttvt to toiovtov au Traaoy, ap oiou tc opOws e'cTreii' erepov ri 

 7rX»?r (pavTacr'iav. A (pavraaia is, it will be seen, according to Plato a variety of So^a. 

 The distinction was perhaps not worth making, but it is perfectly intelligible ; and in restrict- 

 ing a popular term to a scientific sense, Plato is taking no unusual liberty. Aristotle, how- 

 ever, needs the word for another purpose, and accordingly pushes Plato's distinction out of 

 the way. 



The only word used by Aristotle which Plato does not use is av/jiTrXoKri : he wrote av/x- 

 fjLi^ii, but it is remarkable that the word av/ixTrXoKij does occur two or three times over in this 

 part of the dialogue ; hence Aristotle, writing from memoiy, substitutes it for the a-un/jn^i^ of 

 the original. One of the most learned and trustworthy of his commentators, Simplicius, has 

 the gloss : tov YlXarajvos ev tb Tip "^oCpiaTtj Kat ev Tip OjXr;/3o> ti/i; (pavTaaiai' ev fx'i^ei 

 oo^t]^ Te Kai a'ladrjcrew^ TiOefievou, eviaTaaOai ttoos Trji' Oeaiv oia tovtwv ooKei. Now in 

 the Philebus the definition in question does not occur, though the mental act which Plato calls 

 (pavraaia is graphically described, and the cognate participle (pavrai^ofjievov is used in the 

 description (p. 38 c). The passages quoted from the Sophista are therefore here alluded to, 

 for there are none such in any other dialogue, and the restricted use of the term is peculiar 

 to the author of the Sophista. 



' Sometimes without Plato's name, as en tw 'lirwia, iv tw 

 iaiSmvi. It is remarkable that these are the only two dia- 

 logues quoted by name in the Metaphysics : though Plato's 



entire system comes under review in that work, of which one 

 book is appropriated to the theory of ideas alone. The Par- 

 menides, which is largely drawn from, is not once named. 



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