THE SOPHISTA OF PLATO, &c. 



149 



Kviies ev rfi '[v^tKrj, ves, aiye^, -n-pofiaTa. In the Aristotelian treatise itself I am not aware 

 that any system of classification is proposed which would obtain the approbation of modern 

 zoologists. The Politicals and the Sophista are not zoological works, and Aristotle's censure 

 is therefore irrelevant. But the coincidences seem too special to have been accidental. 



4. In a work similar in its scope to the Sophista, the curious treatise irepl '2.o<pi(yTiKwv 

 eXey-^^wv, occurs a definition of " Sophistic," which to my ear is an echo of the Platonic 

 Dialogue. I allude to the often repeated definition, eariv t] aotpiaTtKrj (paivo/xevri (jotpia u\X' ovk 

 ovaa, Koi o aoCpiaTTj^ ~^prjiJiaTiaTri<i airo (paivo/uevrjs aocpias aW ovk o'varj^ (S. E. I. 6). 

 " Sophistic is a wisdom seeming but not real, and the Sophist is a tradesman, whose capital 

 consists of such unreal wisdom." What is this but an abridgment of the ^taipsTiKos X0709 of 

 the Sophista, a definition identical with the vewv kuI irXovalwv efx/uaOoi OtjpevTtj^ — " the 

 hireling hunter of the rich and young," with the very addition which Plato proceeds, with an 

 affectation of logical accuracy, to graft upon it ? 



5. In the same treatise, c. 5, S 1, we read as follows: "Other paralogisms depend on an 

 ambiguity in the terms employed: — whether they are used absolutely or only in a certain 

 sense: for instance, if you say that "that which ' is not ' may be a term in a judgment," they 

 infer the contradiction, ' That which is not, is :' but this is a fallacy, for ' to be this or 

 that' and 'to be' in the abstract are not the same thing. Or conversely, they argue 

 that that which is, is not, if you tell them that any entity is not so and so — say that A is not 

 a man. For not to be this or that is not the same as absolute non-existence'." 



This is but an Aristotelic translation of the following in the Sophista : " Let no one 

 object that we mean by the /u.i^ ov the contrary of the ov, when we dare to affirm that the /u>) ov 

 is : the truth being, that we altogether decline to say anything about the contrary of the oc, 

 whether any such contrary is or is not conceivable by the reason." j;fie?s fxev yap trepl 

 evavTiov tivos avrip (sc, tw ovri) ■^aipeiv iroXXa Xeyo/mev, e'lT eaxiu e'lre fir/ Xoyov e-^ov rj Kat 

 iravTairacnv aXoyov. p. 258 E. * 



To this same passage I suppose Aristotle to allude in the Metaphysica (vi. 4. 13, Bekk, 

 Oxon.) a'XX' w<nrep eK tov uri ovto<s XoyiKws (pacri rtces eivat to fxr) ov oy^ wkXw^ aXXa fxri 

 ov, K. T. X. (Where XoyiKok = ' sensu dialectico,'' as distinguished from (pvaiKw^-) 



6. I shall have more to say on these passages hereafter : for the present they are mentioned 

 for the sake of the coincidence. The ^aai rivei, as already observed, is Aristotle's frequent 

 formula of acknowledgment. If any one doubt that the rives are in this instance a ti's, or if he 

 doubt who the r/y may be, let him hear Aristotle in another part of the same work ; Sio 

 YlXaTwv TpoTTOV TWO. OV KaKWi TJyi; aoCpicTTiKtjv irepl to /nt] ov eTa^ev , Met. v. 2, ^ 3, 

 and then turn to the Sophista, pp. 235 a, 237 a, 258 b, 264 d, passages which it would be 

 tedious to quote, but the upshot of which is the very distinction to which Aristotle alludes. 

 Add p. 254. A of the same dialogue, where the Sophist is described as " running to hide himself 

 in the darkness of the Non Ens," {dTroSiSpcujKwv el? tjji/ tov fit] ovtos (TKoreivoTrira), taking 



* aTrXaJs To^e 17 tt^ \6ye<Tdai Kai fitj Kvpiut^y orav t6 ev 

 fJiepcL Xeyofievov ws d-TrXws eiprj/ieirov \ij<l>6y, olov el to /jlij otf 

 icTt ^o^affTOl/, oTi TO fxi] ov €(TTiy' oil yap TavTdv elvai re Tl 

 Kat elvai a-TrXeo?. ij iraXii/ oxt to ov oiiK earnv ov el twv ''"'^ 



Tt [ITJ e(TTty, oiov ei /itj dv6pwTros, 



' " Plato was right to a certain extent, when he represented 

 the Non-ens as the province of the Sophist." 



