X. On the Syllogism, No. Ill, and on Logic in general. By Augustus De Morgan, 

 F.R.A.S., of Trinity College, Professor of Mathematics in University College, 

 London. 



QRead Feb. 8, 1858.] 



I PUT this paper under the title here given, for the sake of continuity of reference: in 

 scope, however, it is more extensive than those which precede (Vol. viii. Part S; Vol. ix. 

 Part 1). It will best be disposed under two heads. I shall first put together remarks on 

 the object of logic ; on its present state ; on the opinion of the world with respect to it ; on 

 the views which I take of it, in opposition to the world at large as to its advantages, and to 

 the writers upon it as to its details. I shall incidentally answer some objections to my former 

 paper ; objections, not objectors : and I would gladly do something, be it ever so little, to 

 hasten the time when logic shall again be a part of education in the University of Cambridge. 

 I am satisfied that there is no study, however useful, no exercise of the intellect, however 

 essential, but has its own short-comings which can only be made good by the study of mind 

 as mind, psychology ; and induces its own bad habits which can only be eradicated by the 

 study and practice of thought as thought, logic. But psychology and logic, in their turn, 

 require other studies even more than other studies require them. 



In the second part, I shall present the elementary points of the system which I advocate. 

 Which of the two parts should be taken first is a question which each reader must decide for 

 himself. 



Section I. General Considerations. 



I. Eleven years ago, when I began to put together details on which I had been thinking 

 during several previous years, I had not the encouragement which would have arisen from 

 a knowledge of what was then going on in the logical world. In my own mind I was facing 

 Kant's* assertion that logic neither has improved since the time of Aristotle, nor of its own 

 nature can improve, exceptf in perspicuity, accuracy of expression, and the like. I did not 

 know that very high authority was then teaching its alumni to assert that logic had always 



♦ There is an intelligible translation of Kant's logic, and, 

 as I judge by comparison with Tissot, a good one, by John 

 Richardson. London, 1819, 8vo. 



t Of Lambert's additions Kant says that like all legitimate 

 subtilties, they sharpen the intellect, but are of no material 

 use. Logic thinks about thought: what for? that we may 

 think the better, that we may sharpen the intellect. Conse- 



quently, every part of logic which makes us think more acutely 

 conduces to the very use of logic itself. No part of logic is of 

 any material use, in Kant's sense of the word. The scaffolding 

 by which the house was built is of no use to the inhabitants, 

 except indeed when repairs or additions are wanted. But the 

 main question of the utility of logic refers to education, during 

 which the scaiiblding is up. 



