AND ON LOGIC IN GENERAL. 187 



abacus will — at least I see from his writings that he always does — return to unity the moment 

 he drops the counters with which he was acting his professional part. The distincti(m which 

 he played at abrogating, the distinction between the genus in species of metaphysical com- 

 position, and the species in genus of mathematical aggregation, will recur to his nature before 

 the pitch-fork is well out of his hand. The attribute of humanity will then be in his 

 mind common to Newton and Leibnitz, and so will that of phenacostrepticism, if he must 

 needs suppose that the wigs which covered those vast masses of thought were given to un- 

 seemly rotation about their polar axes. 



VIII. I now come to the strongest of the differences between my own views and those 

 which have been recently propounded. A clear detail of the point is due to the eminence 

 of those from whom I differ : and all the remainder of this paper will contain very frequent 

 illustrations of a distinction which I am confident has been wholly misconceived. 



Aristotle saw that though the genus contains more than the species, more extent, more 

 things, yet the species also contains more than the genus, each thine/ takes more description, 

 more fulness of quality. Our own language will make the distinction expressively : — ani- 

 mal is more than man ; and there is more in a man than in an animal : animal is horse, 

 dog*, &c. as well as man, but a man has reason, which an animal other than man has not. 

 All the attributes make up the ovaia, and accordingly (Categories, cap. 5) the species has more 

 substance than the genus ; to el^os -rod yevovg /maWov oixria. Again, (Metaphysics, lib. iv. 

 or v. cap. 25) the genus is called part of the species, but otherwise the species is part of the 

 genus ; dio to 'y^^""^ ''"'''' e'lcous kuI fxepo^ Xeyerai' aWtos oe to eloos rod yevovi /uepo^. In 

 the Physics (lib. v. cap. 5) various illustrations are given.- The sense of this is very clear; as 

 follows : 



Species in genus. All man is in animal : whole class man part of class animal. 



Genus in species. All animal is in man : whole attribute animal component of attribute man. 



The whole of man is in animal, European, Asiatic, &c. The whole of animal is in man, 

 body, organisation, sentience, want of food, power to get it, instinct of reproduction, &c. But 

 man is not all animal, witness horse, dog, &c. : nor is animal all man, witness all the attri- 

 butes which make up the distinction of reason. Hence we may say, in one reading, that 

 man is universal, animal particular : in the other, that animal is universal and man parti- 

 cular. And this is the great distinction, to the sides of which it was always intended to 

 give the words extension and comprehension. 



This distinction was very little attended to. It always had its scholastic name : the species 

 as part of the genus was a part of the logical whole ; the genus as part of the species was a 

 part of the metaphysical whole. The schoolmen were no mean proficients in the art of saying 

 what they meant: and they meant to keep 'species in genus' within logic, and to drive 'genus 

 in species' into metaphysics. 



* Since putting down tiiese instances, I happened to see in 

 the recent English translation of Aristotle's metaphysics (1. iv. 

 c. 26) that man, horse, god, are animals. I took it for granted 

 that a transposition of letters had taken place in the last 



word ; but on looking at Aristotle, I found 6co'v. The con- 

 fusion arises from the practice of translating Jraov by animal: 

 it should be living being ; the English word animal agrees 

 with the middle Latin word in meaning corpus animatnm. 



24—2 



