202 



Mk DE morgan, on the syllogism. No. Ill, 



I received from my own nomenclature: for the distinction of contrary and supercontrary was 

 either indistinctly conceived by the writers, or, which is more likely, their habits of phraseo- 

 logy had been fashioned in youth upon a logical discipline which did not bring out the dis- 

 tinction in its living force, so that their words were not separatively adequate to their thoughts. 

 Accordingly, though churchman and heretic, or the synonymes, were clearly meant for super- 

 contrary terms, that is, every man in their universe was one or the other, and some (I think it 

 was many) were both, yet sometimes the words had the contrary, and sometimes the super- 

 contrary, sense, in a manner which would have perplexed a person incognisant of the source of 

 confusion. The comparison of one couple of pages seemed to give the right to infer ' Some 

 churchmen are dissenters :' while another couple seemed to allow us to conclude that orthodox 

 and heretic are not repugnant attributes. 



In connexion with the supercontrary relation, I have the following words : — Mathematical, 

 Extensively supercontrary, intensively subcontrary, copartient complement ; Metaphysical, In- 

 tensively subcontrary, generic accident, specific non-accident, irrepugnant alternative. Now 

 I observe that when a compound name exists, the blame of its existence, if any, must be 

 thrown upon the components. If the relations of terminal ambiguity may have names, I cannot 

 choose but call the supercontrary a copartient complement, because it is* so. This disposes 

 of the apparent superfluity of names. And we thus draw attention to some much -wanted dis- 

 tinctions. The common word alternative frequently means ' one or the other or both ' and 

 more frequently ' one or the other but not both.' There is no word in common use to mark 

 the distinction ; nor have educated logicians yet introduced the distinction of repugnant alter- 

 native and irrepugnant alternative. 



XIX. By accustoming the mind to the combination of relations, under the clearness of 

 well-understood language, we dispense with the logician's abacus, even in the most complicated 

 cases. For example, take the following syllogism : ' We must not say that either bodily strength 

 or meanness is a necessary alternative, for courage and meanness are incompatible, while courage 

 does not depend on bodily strength.' Compare it with the following: ' Health is essential to 

 comfort and comfort to full use of the faculties, whence health is essential to full use of the 

 faculties.' The second is a very obvious consequence, while the first, as given, is either a very 

 dark one, or a non sequitur of mine, as a trap. Will the reader say which, honestly, without 

 going to the abacus .-' A full and clear notion, such as practice only gives, of the meanings 

 of alternance, repugnance, and dependence, would answer the question of itself. 



The educated world, though not so far advanced in combination of relation as it would be 

 under instruction in the logic of second intentions, has made far too much progress to need the 

 abacus as a means of power, in usual cases ; accordingly, it laughs at the abacus and those 

 who use it. It does not value the instrument as an analyser, because it derives no power from 

 the analysis, as commonly made. In like manner, one who could perform division in his head, 



* The honest sailor's mistake is no mistake at all about 

 composition of names to which meaning has been previously 

 attached. He scorned the French for calling a cabbage a 

 shoe (chou) : why, said he, can't they call it a cabbage, when 

 they must know it w one ? A word with a meaning to it is a 



thing, or has the privileges of a thing; one of which is a right 

 to combine whenever combination can be. Hence when the 

 names A and B have been attached to meanings, the only 

 question about the introduction of AB is, does the compound 

 exist or not ? 



