212 



Mk DE morgan, on the syllogism, No. Ill, 



XXIX. Logico-metaphysical Reading. Terminal Precision, § xvii. 4. 



Proposition of Assertion. 



Y an attribute of the universe 



Y and others components of X 



Y component and compound of X 



Y compound of X and others 



Y neither component nor com- 

 pound of either X or x 



Y and others components of x 



Y component and compound of x 



Y compound of x and others 



Y an exchident of the universe 



T predicated of X as 



Universal Attribute 

 Essential Alternative 



Generic Attribute 



Independent Essential 



Specific Attribute 

 Dependent Essential 



[Specific Accident 

 (Generic Non-accident 

 Inessential Dependent 



Universal Accident and Non- 

 accident 

 Inessential, Irrepugnatit, 

 Inalternative, Independent 



("Generic Accident 

 (Specific Non-accident 

 Irrepugnant Alternative 



Specific Excludent 

 Repugnant Alternative 



Generic Excludent 

 Inalternative Repugnant 



Universal Excludent. 



X subjected to Y as 



Dependent Alternative 



[Specific Accident 

 JGeneric Non-accident 

 Inessential Dependent 



Specific Attribute 

 Dependent Essential 



Generic Attribute 

 Independent Essential 



Universal Accident and Non- 

 accident 

 Inessential, Irrepugnant, 

 Inalternative, Independent 



Generic Accident 

 Specific Non-accident 

 Irrepugnant Alternative 



Specific Excludent 

 Repugnant Alternative 



Generic Excludent 

 Inalternative Repugnant 



Notation. 



X]o]Y 



XIIY 



X[o[Y 



XMY 



XIIY 



X]o[Y 



The words subidentical &c. may also be introduced, in metaphysical sense, referring to in- 

 tension, from the second table, with inversion of prepositions. Thus X ] o] Y means that X 

 is a superidentical of Y, and Y a subidentical of X. 



XXX. I shall now proceed to some remarks and developments : — 



Arithmetical whole. In the third table, in this reading, X and Y are treated as qualities ; 

 and ' Y is always in X' means that the quality Y is always recognised as a component of the 

 quality X. Thus in the more objective side of this whole we read ' Every (object) man is 

 (object) animal :' in the more subjective side we read ' Some (instance of quality) animal is in 

 every (instance of quality) human.' This constitutes the whole of what many writers in this 

 country now accept as the distinction between extension and comprehension : but, as to the 

 distinction which I have called that of extension and intension, this distinction is only that of 

 object and quality, both in extension. See S viii. 



Those who supply complete terms of quantification make a mixture of what I called in my 

 second paper examplar and cumiilar reading ; as in 'All X is some Y ' and ' No X is any Y.' 

 When it is postulated that propositions shall be formed by every possible distribution of the 

 terms of quantity, all and some, the two propositions ' All X is all Y ' and ' Some X is not 

 some Y ' arise. The first is X | | Y of the second table ; the other has no place in the propo- 



