certain Processes of the Human Understanding. , 109 



would be affected by violent weeping to be acted on by some cause purely physi- 

 cal : now, even when awake, the moral frame of mind is in some small degree 

 liable to the species of external action here supposed ; and the fact is general ; 

 there is no train of correlative affections either between mind or body, or between 

 the thoughts and affections of the mind, that is not liable to commence at either 

 end of the chain. When we are awake, this liability is regulated by the action 

 of other causes ; the processes of the mind are subject to both the will and the 

 senses, there can, therefore (generally speaking), be no illusion ; the scenes and 

 occupations of reality are before us, and all the control of the active faculties is 

 in operation. Now, to recur to the examples just given, a person, if he is of a 

 delicate frame, may, under the influence of some nervous affection, be, even while 

 awake, disposed to gloomy views of affairs ; but let him fall asleep — he is instantly 

 head and ears plunged into a bottomless abyss of perils, distresses, and labours, 

 defined or undefined, taking form in the shape of some gigantic calamity, or cloud- 

 ing the prospect with the obscurity of terror and inconceivable ruin. It becomes 

 a dream, or that species of oppressive consciousness which is called a nightmare. 

 Now, if the images of a dream are supposed to be presented in succession, a 

 very different order of phenomena from those hitherto contemplated takes place; 

 all, however, the result of the two main principles now stated, viz., the apparent 

 realization of the idea, and the governing law of suggestion. The general con- 

 dition will be best conceived by an illustrative method of statement ; but first let 

 me impress the two points to be illustrated. The moment the thought occurs, the 

 thing appears : and as every thing is likely to present some suggestion, no sooner 

 does it appear than some new fancy starts to mind, so as to place the whole in a 

 new relation to the dreamer. This may be exemplified : a person dreams of some 

 friend who lives in a distant city ; the individual at once becomes present : this 

 individual exercises some particular calling, or has habits which characterize him; 

 these at once are suggested and realized ; they absolutely imply the notion of 

 some locality, and the locality becomes present. This implies a change of place, 

 and at once, as if his night-cap were the wishing-cap of the fairy tale, the dreamer 

 is transported with a thought over the intervening billows or mile-stones, and 

 without any interruptions from collisions, explosions, or upsets, is set down in the 

 well remembered street. No sooner is he there, than his friend, who is, perhaps, 

 a great traveller, begins the story of some adventure in returning from the con- 



