certain Processes of the Human Understanding. 107 



haps, no idea so apt to be held in due subordination to the reality of things ; and 

 yet every one can at once recal cases enough in which it is liable to be variously 

 falsified in the perspective of thought. The case of dramatic fiction may, perhaps, 

 be considered most apposite ; a train of occurrences, which involves the idea of 

 time, is presented ; and though the waking man is quite cognizant of the actual 

 state of the case, yet a latent but operative impression follows the law of habit 

 more quickly than the judgment of the reason ; and the conditions of a fictitious 

 succession are sufficiently realized, to affect the imagination. To produce such illu- 

 sions, in the highest perfection, is indeed the end of a subtle art, by which the 

 poet can impose his waking dream upon the reader. 



" Qui pectus inaniter angit, 

 Irritat, mulcet falsis terroribus implet, 

 Ut magus: et modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis." 



But when, in sleep, a complex conception or train of ideas (for I suppose 

 either case), involving the idea of succession, is presented, the idea then not 

 mei'ely alfects the imagination with a latent impression — the impression takes the 

 form of reality, and the conception becomes affected by the elements of time and 

 space. A picture when dreamed of is likely to assume the appearance of reality, 

 because the artifice of perspective suggests the impression of distance ; and every 

 ♦ other combination may convey similarly some impression, which, once received as 

 real, alters the condition of the case. And here let it be observed, there can be 

 no controversy on the point ; however it may be explained, the idea of duration 

 is unreal ; it must at once be admitted to be but a component idea — involved, 

 to be sure, in a very curious manner well worthy of attention, but offering abso- 

 lutely no obstacle to any theoi'y in question. But having gained this point, it 

 suggests a good deal. 



First, were we to look no farther, it seems plain that the same explanation may 

 be applied to any other ideas which may seem to form parts of a dream ; that (to 

 use the short cut of illustration) the dream was but as a face seen in a fire, in 

 which a few leading lines take the shape of a familiar combination, and, though 

 imperfect, carry with them the entire of that which they partially represent. The 

 same process (whatever it may be) which gives visible appearance to a mere idea, 

 may be well supposed to give visionary completeness of outline to a few random 

 touches of thought. This, let it be observed, has a very distinct parallel in the 



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