certain Processes of the Human Understanding. 101 



to which I have adverted, I do not exclude the operation of any other process 

 that may be insisted upon. I simply have endeavoured to place due bounds to 

 an usurpation in favour of some known faculties, and to restore to another its 

 own due jurisdiction. I am not to be understood as excluding the separate work- 

 ings of attention and volition from their very observable place in every one of 

 the operations just noticed. But what I have contended for is reducible to the 

 nearly self-evident fact, that in the course of all habitual thoughts, there is a point 

 where the separateness of associated ideas ceases to be perceived, and I say, that 

 at the same point these separate acts of attention and volition also cease ; they 

 are neither necessary nor conceivable, or indicated by any sign, and their as- 

 sumption is, therefore, altogether gratuitous. 



The orator, as he follows out the details, which appear in the perspective of 

 his ideas, will direct the minutest attention to each as it passes in array: while he 

 is following out this long chain, he is obviously exerting a voluntary and con- 

 scious attention to the verbal evolution of its parts. And the very same law of 

 association which offered the first summary glance of his whole argument, operates 

 as he proceeds, and presents similar combinations at the separate stages. With 

 this, suggestions, which are no more than imperfect associations, are starting 

 up in proportion to the range of the speaker's mind. But reflect what an absurd 

 medley of processes there should be, if we admit that throughout this lengthened 

 operation the whole chain is still retained before him by a continued succession 

 of iterations of the same rapid series of separate attentions and volitions ; the ne- 

 cessary consequence of Mr. Stewart's assumption, that this chain is put together 

 by this inconceivable operation : whereas, by the explanation which has been here 

 offered, the formed combination is already there, lying like a text-book before a 

 lecturer, and needing no jarring dance of imperceptible volitions and attentions ; 

 volitions unwilled, and attentions unattended to : no inconceivable analysis to 

 supersede and frustrate those fundamental operations to which, by Mr. Stewart's 

 own repeated admissions, direct or implied, the very power of thinking at all is 

 due. 



The view here oflTered may be illustrated with some precision. Every one 

 may be supposed to dwell within some circle of familiar localities which are va- 

 riously combined in his memory. Within this compass a hundred roads and by- 

 paths are within the instant command of his recollection, and as in conception 



