90 Rev. J. Wills on Mr. Stewart's Explanation of 



A result whieh, if this very faulty method of statement were to be allowed, would 

 amount to something different from the metaphysical asymptotes, involved in 

 Mr. Stewart's indefinite acceleration.* 



There is one example brought forward by Mr. Stewart among the statements 

 by which he is first led to the conclusion which I have been examining in this 

 essay. I could not have noticed it much sooner without anticipating the infe- 

 rences at which I have now arrived. The following is Mr. Stewart's statement : 

 " It has been proved by optical writers, that in perceiving the distances of visible 

 objects from the eye, there is a judgment of the understanding antecedent to the 

 perception. In some cases this judgment is founded on a variety of circumstances 

 combined together, — the conformation of the organ necessary for distinct vision ; 

 the inclination of the optic axis ; the distinctness or indistinctness of the minute 

 parts of the object; the distances of the intervening objects from each other, and 

 from the eye ; and, perhaps, on other circumstances besides these : and yet, in 

 consequence of our familiarity with such processes from our earliest infancy, the 

 perception seems to be instantaneous ; and it requires much reasoning to convince 

 persons unaccustomed to philosophical speculations that the fact is otherwise." 

 I shall not here dwell on the very equivocal language used by Mr. Stewart. The 

 purpose for which he uses the example is, however, such as to imply the more 

 objectionable of two senses in which I might take his assertion of a "judgment 

 of the understanding antecedent to the perception ;" that is, that antecedent to 

 the perception some distinct exercise of reason, referring to the separate inci- 

 dents of the actual perception, occurs. In this sense, the mere statement is a suf- 

 ficient reply ; the notion conveys an utter absurdity. If, however, Mr. Stewart 

 simply means the process of the understanding, by which inferences respecting 

 the distances of visible objects have been gradually obtained; so that a judgment, 

 grounded on such reasonings as he has stated, goes before and modifies the per- 

 ception, forming, in accordance with his views, an antecedent part of it ; while the 

 extreme rapidity of the mind prevents any consciousness of the distinctness in 

 time between the two processes ; his fallacy is certainly less glaring, but I 

 must observe, that it only becomes so by simplifying the assumed process. Now, 



• The method is faulty, because it confuses two very distinct classes of phenomena: the aggre- 

 gate perceptions of mere consciousness, and the complex formations of association. 



