certain Processes of the Human Understanding. 89 



human mind. In truth, it is only when the habit is actually acquired that any 

 idea of the act can be realized to conception ; and it then escapes the powers of 

 distinct analysis. But on this point I shall only need to remind you that the 

 same difficulty must exist, however the matter be explained. It belongs not to 

 the solution, but to the fact. 



There is perhaps more real difficulty affecting the case of the jugglers, which 

 is noticed by Mr. Stewart. And the more, because, as in many acts of the mind, 

 it is in some degree entangled with other laws of action. Yet, so far as the 

 main point, it is not really difficult to explain. The eye and hand, with all their 

 involved rapidity, are still kept under the unerring government of a single con- 

 ception of a complex continuous movement, every part of which is together pre- 

 sent to the mind. Were it not for this, indeed, it would not be difficult to prove 

 that this, and all other similar feats, would be utterly impracticable. A distinct 

 interference of volition would arrest the juggler's flying and circling balls; as 

 it would precipitate the rope dancer, another of Mr. Stewart's cases, from his 

 dangerous height. In this case the movement and the balance are preserved by 

 not thinking of the emergency of the instant : but yielding to the constant action 

 of a conception and habitual impulse, which have been called mechanical, with a 

 just regard to analogy, because they exclude the uncertainty of the deliberate 

 and voluntary processes of the mind. 



There is withal a distinction which I have hinted, but with which I did not 

 wish to complicate the subject, which demands notice. The cases which I have 

 referred to, as well as the numerous ones which might be mentioned, all fall into 

 two general classes : that oi instantaneous acts which present no difficulty, and lead 

 the investigation with the simplicity of self-evidence to the nature of the opera- 

 tion ; and those which, being continuous, appear at first less reconcileable to the 

 solution which explains them into a single idea. This difficulty (if such it should 

 be called) is but specious : there is no reason against the supposition of one idea 

 being held for any length of time, which the purposes in question require. I am 

 no more bound to the asssumption of a single instantaneous process than Mr. 

 Stewart. I am not bound to disprove, that habit facilitates, and therefore accele- 

 rates any constant succession of ideas : but the inference is as to the result, when 

 this succession has apparently ceased. And this result, according to the view 

 here explained, is simply this, that the limit of such acceleration is a coincidence. 



VOL. XIX. M 



