certain Processes of the Human Understanding. 85 



affirm that it is not proved by any of the alleged examples, and is not necessary 

 for their explanation ; and into the assumption of such a necessity, the entire 

 argument of Mr. Stewart may be resolved. 



This example is very convenient for illustration ; I will, therefore, examine 

 it fully. Now let it be distinctly kept in view, that though the process of reading 

 is in both systems inferred to be the result of a power attained by habit, the dif- 

 ference is as to the nature of that attainment. Mr. Stewart's solution requires 

 that it should be by accelerating that succession of acts, by which every letter 

 of the word is separately noticed. If this be true, then, it is evident that the 

 facility can in no way depend upon perceiving the combination, as it is the prin- 

 ciple that every separate part must be antecedently recognized, and the perception 

 of the combination is but consequent. Therefore, it is quite immaterial how 

 strange the order in which letters are combined, when they are separately so far 

 known as to be instantaneously recognized. Now this can be tested. If any reader 

 who is sufficiently interested in the matter for an experiment, will take the trou- 

 ble to write out a few lines of new combinations of letters, forming words of the 

 ordinary number of letters, or get it done by another, and then try his skill in 

 reading those words with the usual rapidity ; he will immediately discover that, 

 however expert he may consider himself to be, he will be compelled to go back 

 to the old nursery discipline of spelling. Those extremely rapid attentions and 

 volitions will be found to fail when they should be efficient, if the assumption 

 of Mr. Stewart (for, after all, it is no more) be correct. Here, again, I might 

 pause to dwell on the consequences of Mr. Stewart's assumption. The same law 

 which demands successive distinct notices of the letters, essentially requires an 

 equally distinct and separate succession of perceptions of the several parts which 

 form the shape of the letter. The letters taken separately have each a sound 

 different from their syllabic effect, and this again is variously modified according 

 to the combination. Then comes to be recognized the sense which a word ac- 

 quires from context ; and lastly, the train of reason in which the intellect seems 

 to be wholly engaged. If all these several trains are to be separately noticed, 

 according to Mr. Stewart's law, it is evident what a complication of wholly distinct 

 trains of thought must be simultaneously proceeding ; but if Mr. Stewart should 

 stop at any point short of this, it is plain that his whole theory fails ; the explana- 

 tion he must substitute at that point may serve as well for the whole ; the neces- 



