certain Processes of the Human Understanding. 81 



philosopher, who, though far less reasonable than Mr. Stewart upon the subject, 

 offers the advantage of a different observation of the same phenomena. 



Mr. Stewart quotes from Hartley his first example, which is that of a person 

 playing upon the harpsichord. The fingers of the player perform a variety of 

 movements from key to key, each of which, as Hartley observes, is at first an act 

 of distinct volition. By degrees, however, the motions (according to his lan- 

 guage) cling to each other, and the acts of volition grow less and less, until at 

 last they become evanescent. On this case Mr. Stewart says, " thus in the case 

 of performance on the harpsichord, I apprehend that there is an act of the will 

 preceding every motion of the finger, although the player may not be able to 

 recollect these volitions afterwards, and although he may, during the time of his 

 performance, be employed in carrying on a separate train of thought." 



In supporting this proposition, Mr. Stewart observes, that the " player may 

 vary his rate of movement, and play so slowly as to be able to attend to every 

 separate movement :" and on this very justly observes Hartley's unreasonable- 

 ness in assuming two different rules of mental action for the quick and the slow 

 playing. 



It is remarkable that Hartley's reasoning actually terminates in the vulgar 

 notion upon that class of acts commonly called mechanical, from which his in- 

 stance is drawn ; a circumstance which at least seems to show that he has carefully 

 observed, and correctly described the pAewomena, though in his attempt to explain 

 them he was (as usual) misled by a theory. The fact that the distinct acts are 

 not separately the object of any conscious volition or attention, he recognized by 

 direct observation : it was perhaps rash to infer the absence of these elements : 

 but if Hartley knew any thing about the art from which he exemplified his rea- 

 soning, he must also have observed, that these separate attentions and volitions 

 were in certain movements of the player necessarily impossible, and that, there- 

 fore, some other law must be sought for : the automatic movement is very like 

 the truth, and though liable to Mr. Stewart's objections, would be far easier to 

 support than his own solution. I trust to convince the Academy that there Is no 

 proof of the separate volitions assumed by Mr. Stewart, in either quick or slow 

 movements. Volitions there must be, but executed under the intervention of 

 another process ; a process, it js true, still to be referred to the effect of habit, 



VOL. XIX. L 



