Rev. J. Wills on certain Processes of the Understanding. 79 



derful effect of practice, in the formation of habits, has been often and justly 

 taken notice of, as one of the most curious circumstances in the human constitu- 

 tion. A mechanical operation, for example, which we at first performed with 

 the utmost difficulty, comes in time to be so familiar to us, that we are able to 

 perform it without the smallest danger of mistake, even while the attention appears 

 to be completely engaged with other subjects. The truth seems to be, that in 

 consequence of the association of ideas, the different steps of the process present 

 themselves successively to the thoughts, without any recollection on our part, 

 and with a degree of rapidity proportioned to the length of our experience ; 

 so as to save us entirely the trouble of hesitation and reflection, by giving us 

 every moment a precise and steady notion of the effect to be produced." Ac- 

 cording to this statement, a succession of acts of attention and volition are sup- 

 posed to pass through the mind with a rapidity too great to be perceived, and 

 for which, therefore, there can be no argument but the necessity of the thing ; 

 because, according to Mr. Stewart, no other will explain the phenomena. These 

 notions are so involved in the entire of Mr. Stewart's Theory of the Mind, that 

 were I to attempt a full analysis of his reasoning It would necessarily lead me 

 into a very prolonged discussion, which should commence by a systematic expo- 

 sition of those elementary views of the mind and its functions, which I conceive 

 to be entangled with many errors by Mr. Stewart. The difficulty attendant on 

 such an undertaking would be enormous : for 1 must confess that I cannot so 

 easily satisfy myself as Mr. Stewart and other writers on the same subject seem 

 to have done, with any definition of those elementary processes of the mind, on 

 which so much reasoning is built. 



The elementary fallacy in which I conceive Mr. Stewart's error to have 

 originated, is comprised in his very first step. It is difficult to speak satisfacto- 

 rily of a function so purely elementary as consciousness. Like light, it is chiefly 

 apprehended by reflection from surrounding things : but it is not hard to 

 point out the mistake which Is Implied in Mr. Stewart's view. He fails to observe 

 that the mind apprehends by wholes before it perceives by parts. Consciousness, 

 as it may be described (I do not pretend to define), appears to be the sum of 

 sensations and apprehensions of whatever nature, which constitute the whole 

 state of mind at any moment. The fallacy contained In Mr. Stewart's first ex- 

 amples, consists in an Implication that every part of this aggregate is separately 



