110 



claims any title ; but he gives us the following perspicuous 

 views in one of his most distinguished illustrations. 



" It is because almost our whole attention is employed, 

 not upon the visible and representing, but upon the tangible 

 and represented objects, that in our imaginations we are apt 

 to ascribe to the former, a degree of magnitude which does 

 not belong to them, but which belongs altogether to the 

 latter. If you shut one eye, and hold immediately before 

 the other a small circle of plain glass of not more than half 

 an inch in diameter, you may see through that circle, the 

 most extensive prospect, lawns and woods, and arms of the 

 sea, and distant mountains. You are apt to imagine that 

 the landscape which is thus presented to you — that the vi- 

 sible picture which you thus see — is immensely great and ex- 

 tensive. The tangible objects which this picture represents 

 undoubtedly are so. But the visible picture which repre- 

 sents them can be no greater than the little visible circle, 

 through which you see it. If while you are looking through 

 this circle, you could conceive a fairy hand and a fairy 

 pencil, to come between your eye and the glass, that pencil 

 could delineate on that little glass the outline of all those ex- 

 tensive lawns and woods, and arms of the sea, and distant 

 mountains, in the full and exact dimensions with which they 

 are really seen by the eye." (Page 222.) 



Adopting these views, we may conclude that previous to 

 all EXPERIENCE, a new-born child can only perceive at first 

 a circle of light of the dimensions of its pupil. It is per- 

 haps the first object (if it is entitled to that name) which it 



