152 



dence and guilt; and in fine, lo elevate the nature of man, 

 by rendering him conversant with truth and virtue. And 

 last of all, in the human constitution is revealed that most 

 disputed of his faculties, yet the most absolute and inviolate 

 in the eye of its Author — free-will. By this, man has the 

 high prerogative of submitting, according to his inclinations, 

 to the government of his appetites and passions, or of his 

 conscience and reason. By this he becomes a moral and ac- 

 countable creature, is capable of vice or virtue, and ob- 

 noxious to punishment or reward. 



Let us close for a moment the volume of history, and con- 

 sider what would be the probable conduct of creatures so 

 constituted, from their creation to the consummation of all 

 things. It is evident that the impulse of the passions would 

 be at first omnipotent. Conscience in its infancy is rather a 

 capacity than a power. We must witness oppression and 

 sympathise with the injured, before this faculty is developed: 

 we must meditate injustice, we must become in imagina- 

 tion a spectator of our offence, * we must feel that specta- 

 tor's sympathy for the offended, and then for the first time 

 Conscience finds employment. Reason is later in its exer- 

 cise; it must have witnessed sure and inevitable, though dis- 

 tant consequences, it must have learned that present pain 

 may end in future pleasure; and the happiness of a moment, 

 in the misery of years. Then, and not until then, does 



• See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. 



