174 THE THEORY OF SENSATION. 



But as some philosophers have denied the existence of mind on the 

 one hand, so have others disputed that of matter on the other. 

 Among the latter Bishop Berkeley stands distinguished. He assailed 

 the sceptical philosophy on its own arena. "We have evidence," said 

 its supporters, " of the existence of matter ; this is proved to us by the 

 testimony of our senses, hut we have no proof of the existence of any- 

 thing else." " Nay," rejoins the Bishop, " we have evidence of the 

 existence of mind from our consciousness of its operations, hut we 

 have no evidence that there is any such substance as matter. We 

 have, it is true, certain notions which we call sensations, but how can 

 we safely go farther and say that there exists anything beyond the 

 compass of our own minds con-esponding to those feelings ?" Now, we 

 cannot but confess, that of the two hypotheses, the latter is by far the 

 most tenable. We, certainly, have stronger evidence of our own 

 existence than of that of anything besides ; and however absurd, 

 however contradictory to our instinctive belief both of these notions 

 may be, we deem that of two indefensible positions, that which 

 denies the existence of matter is far less open to assault than that 

 which repudiates the existence of mind. 



While, then, one set of sceptical philosophers explain sensation as 

 being the production of mere matter, and another as being nothing 

 but various operations of mind unconnected with anything external, 

 our definition assumes the separate existence of one order of substance 

 called mind, the distinguishing quality of which is a capacity for 

 thinking ; and of another totally distinct kind of substance, called 

 matter, which has for its primary qualities extension and impenetra- 

 bility. The matter of the body being affected by external objects, the 

 mind receives certain corresponding mipressions — or, in other words, 

 certain states of the substance called matter are immediately followed 

 by certain states of the substance called mind. These mental states 

 we term sensations. 



This leads us again to the phraseology of our definition, which 

 explains sensation to be a general term expressive of certain states 

 of mind. 



What has just been advanced was intended to shew that we assume 

 in this discussion the separate existence of mind. We wish now to 

 shew that sensation is an affection of mind. — " Certain states of 

 mind" says our definition. This is opposed to the ancient Platonic 

 dogma, that sensation appertained to the animal soul. Man was, by 

 this system, divided into the body, the animal soul which was shared 

 in common with the brutes, and to which our various appetites and 

 passions were referred, and the spirit or immortal essence which 

 survived the dissolution of the body. St. Paul adopts this phraseo- 

 logy in the epistle to the The.ssalonians, where he prays that the 

 " whole spirit, (the principle of the rational life) — and soul, (the prin- 

 ciple of the sensitive life) — and body, (the mere animal and material 

 part) might be preserved blameless to the coming of the Lord Jesus 

 Christ." In reply to this theory, we may merely observe, that of the 

 existence of the animal soul distinct from the rational spirit there is 

 no proof whatever. There is the material substance, the body, of the 



