THB THEORY OE SENSATION. 175 



existence of which we have an irresistible belief ; there is the imma- 

 terial substance, the mind, of the existence of which we have an 

 irrepressible consciousness ; and we know, by experience, that this 

 which we call ourselves, can exist in various states of thought and 

 feeling, but that there is any third essence we have no evidence, for 

 the language of the Apostle must not be regarded as such, seeing 

 that he only aimed at expressing, in the current phraseology of the 

 day, his desire that the entire nature might be preserved in allegiance 

 to God. Were his words employed in defence of a philosophical 

 theory, other expressions might be taken from the Sacred Volume 

 to overthrow some of the surest discoveries of science ; but it should 

 ever be borne in mind, that the Bible was given us, not as a revealer 

 of philosophy, but of morality and godliness, and that the truths it 

 contains are expressed, not in the strict language of modem science, 

 but in tenns which would be understood by those among whom the 

 revelations it contains of the divine will were first promulgated. 



Sensation, then, is a state of the one immaterial principle — the 

 mind, or rational spirit, and not of the animal soul, according to the 

 ancients. 



Our definition is also opposed to the popular notion that it is the 

 bodily organs which experience sensation. Although for common 

 use the phraseology may be sufficiently correct, yet, strictly speaking, 

 it is not the ear which listens, or the eye which sees, or the hand 

 which feels. If my finger is lacerated, it is not my finger, but 

 myself, that is, the mind, which feels the pain of the laceration. The 

 bodily organs are the instniments of, but are not endowed with sen- 

 sation. When I look at the sun, it is not my eye which sees it, but 

 the mind, by the means of the eye. It is no more the optical instru- 

 ment of the body which beholds that luminary than, to use Dr. 

 Reid's illustration, is it the telescope which sees the satellites of 

 Jupiter, indiscernible without its aid. And the same argument sup- 

 ports this position as that by which we contend for the immateriality 

 of mind, namely, the conscious unsuitability of these aflTections to 

 mere matter ; for if it be possible for a system of bones and muscles 

 to experience sensation, there is no reason why it may not perceive, 

 and remember, and reason. If the body can feel the pain arising 

 from a dislocation, there seems no reason why it may not be suscep- 

 tible of the pain of anxiety or remorse. The aflections may be 

 totally diflferent in some respects, yet in this they seem to be alike, 

 that neither of them can be conceived as appertaining to that which 

 is merely material. 



As an objection to the position that sensation is a mental state, it 

 may be urged that, for example, when the wrist is sprained, the 

 pain is certainly felt in the wrist, and that, therefore, it is the wrist 

 that feels. 



In reply to this objection, some would maintain that it is only by 

 experience we ascertain the particular part of the body, a diseased 

 state of which is connected with a particular pain. The pain of tooth- 

 ache, and the pain of a broken leg, are according to this system felt in 

 the same plaoe> and it is only by a gradual process that we learn to 



