1831.] Parliamentary Reform. 363 



be formed. What house is there that does not pay 10. rent ? The 

 direct result would be, that the members would be returned by a mob ; 

 and that the House of Commons would be so far from representing any 

 thing else, that it would itself be in constant submission to that mob. 

 Liverpool has now, we believe, 5,000 electors ; and the scenes disclosed, 

 and disclosing, before the Committee trying the election for bribery, 

 may lead us to think Liverpool sufficiently in the hands of the rabble 

 as it is. But the new system would give it 14,000 electors, generally 

 of a still lower class, we may imagine with what an increase to the 

 purity of election. But a House of Commons returned exclusively by the 

 influence of the 10. householders, would be almost totally composed 

 of men who had won their way into the House by flattering the passions 

 and follies, or pledging themselves to gratify the revenge of the multi- 

 tude. But such a House, from its very nature, would rapidly come into 

 direct collision with the House of Lords. The lower orders in no land 

 have any strong affection for the higher ; and it would be the highest 

 delight of the populace to curtail the privileges, in the idea of mortify- 

 ing the pride of the peerage. A House elected on the strictly popular 

 principle would stand in a situation of natural antipathy and contrast to 

 the House representing the great estates and hereditary honours of the 

 kingdom. Before a Session was over they must clash. Every day 

 some point of business arises in which the privileges of both Houses are 

 involved, and the most violent collision is now prevented only by the cir- 

 cumstance, that the interests of the peerage are now virtually repre- 

 sented in the House of Commons. There the collision takes place, and 

 the crush of the peerage is thus prevented. But let a House of Com- 

 mons on the new system, strengthened in every step by the popular 

 force, and rendered absolutely irresistible, as it must be, by being the 

 direct instrument of its masters and creators, the multitude, feel itself 

 resisted in any measure, however rash and unconstitutional, by the 

 House of Lords, and that House must be broken into fragments at once. 

 The House of Commons has the purse and the physical force, the House 

 of Lords nothing but its parchments. What must be the result of such 

 a contest ? But what would be the first demands made by the multi- 

 tude on their instrument and slave the House of Commons ? There is 

 no concealment on the point. Interference with tithes is one of the 

 most popular topics even now, and would unquestionably form one of the 

 most immediate and popular employments of a New House of Commons. 

 The measure may be either bad or good. But it would certainly be 

 resisted by the peerage. Then would come the collision; and the 

 House of Lords would be broken down in a moment. The plausible 

 outcry would be, as Canning expressed it ' ' Is an unreformed House 

 of Lords to be suffered to counteract the will of a reformed House of 

 Commons ? The result would be its fall, and after it that of the crown ; 

 for the Peers are now the chief bulwark between the crown and the pos- 

 sible rashness or violence of the Commons. The result again would be a 

 repetition of the scenes of Charles the First's reign. The crown would 

 either appeal to the remaining loyalty of the empire, and defend itself 

 by force ; or it would perish without a civil war, and a republic would 

 be the substitute. But what has been the experience of England in 

 1648, and of France in 1793 ? No republic on a large scale can ever 

 permanently subsist in Europe ; for the obvious reason, that the close 

 contact in which the European states exist renders war inevitable ; and 



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